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NOTES
THE FAIR HOUSING ACT, OXFORD HOUSE, AND THE
LIMITS OF LOCAL CONTROL OVER THE REGULATION OF
GROUP HOMES FOR RECOVERING ADDICTS
When group home operators, Oxford House, Inc., challenged a
zoning ordinance in the Chicago suburb of Palatine, Illinois, in
March 1993, Mayor Rita Mullins thought her town was being
singled out as a test case. During a summer trip to a meeting of
the United States Conference of Mayors, however, Mullins found
Palatine was not alone.1 Many of her counterparts noted similar
experiences with Oxford Houses in their own jurisdictions.2
The Palatine ordinance at issue limited the number of unre-
lated people in a single-family residence to three and required
"group homes"3 to have around-the-clock professional staffing.4
1. Karen C. Krause, Group Home Dispute Expands: Palatine Not the Only Target
of Housing Complaints, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 11, 1993, at 1.
2. Id. ("'I found in that one room at least one third of them had problems with
this one particular agency.'") (quoting Mullins); Joyce Price, HUD Investigations
Questioned: Agency Goes to Bat for Rehab Centers That Challenge Zoning Laws,
WASH. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1994, at A3. With more than 500 homes in 36 states, Oxford
House has been involved in 80 disputes with local officials across the country. Id.
3. The term "group home" describes a diverse range of facilities for the care and
treatment of a special population in a residential or normalized setting. See PETER
W. SALSICH, JR., LAND USE REGULATION § 7.07 (1991). Disparities in staffing, regula-
tion, and services among homes for the many different populations that can benefit
from such residential treatment account for many of the problems inherent in their
regulation. This Note is concerned primarily with loosely structured recovery homes,
which facilitate drug and alcohol rehabilitation with no professional staff and mini-
mal regulatory supervision.
4. United States v. Village of Palatine, 845 F. Supp. 540 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (denying
village motion to dismiss). The Palatine litigation is variously reported as follows:
United States v. Village of Palatine, 3 Am. Disabilities Dec. (Law. Co-op) 271 (N.D.
Ill. 1993) (magistrate judge's recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law),
adopted, No. 93-C-2154, 1993 WL 462848 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 9, 1993) (adopting
magistrate's recommendation and grant of Oxford House request for preliminary
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The recovery home established by Oxford House required twelve
recovering addicts to pay the rent, and its charter required the
residents to be self-sufficient in their pursuit of a sober lifestyle,
thus precluding the use of paid staff.5
Oxford House, Inc. is an umbrella organization for a network
of independent Oxford Houses around the country. Its home in
Palatine, like the hundreds of others it has helped start, is not a
treatment facility but a group residence for recovering alcoholics
and drug addicts.' The self-governing, unsupervised homes en-
force a strict alcohol- and drug-free lifestyle to support the resi-
dents in their recovery.7
Boosted by the inclusion of substance abusers as a protected
class under the Fair Housing Act' (FHA) and federally mandat-
ed start-up grants under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988,'
Oxford House helped create nearly 500 group homes for recover-
ing addicts and alcoholics between 1988 and 1994.0 The con-
cept, however, has spawned imitations, particularly in California
where many such homes are little more than flophouses run by
welfare profiteers." Although group homes chartered by Oxford
House generally have been well managed, government start-up
loans are available to any person or group who seeks to estab-
injunction), vacated, 37 F.3d 1230 (7th Cir. 1994).
5. Palatine, 845 F. Supp. at 541; see infra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
6. Carey Q. Gelernter, Oxford House, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 17, 1994, at MI.
7. Oxford House: A Success Story, WASH. POST, May 15, 1993, at A24.
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The Act was amended by the
Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 to add handicapped people as a protected
class. See infra notes 43-54 and accompanying text.
9. Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 2036, 102 Stat. 4181, 4202 (current version at 42
U.S.C. § 300x-25 (Supp. V 1993)). The provision was reauthorized in the ADAMHA
Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 102-321, § 1925, 106 Stat. 323, 393-94 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 300x-25 (Supp. V 1993)). It requires states to establish revolving loan
funds of at least $100,000 to help start homes in the Oxford House model. Id.; see
infra note 65 and accompanying text.
10. See Gelernter, supra note 6, at Ml. A thorough review of the Oxford House
history is available in detailed findings of fact accompanying Oxford House--C v.
City of St. Louis, 843 F. Supp. 1556, 1562-64 (E.D. Mo. 1994).
11. Pamela Warrick & Claire Spiegel, Paying a Price to Stay Sober, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 21, 1992, at Al. Spiegel and Warrick describe horrendous conditions in some of
California's so-called "sober-living homes" started with state money under the fed-
erally mandated revolving loan program created by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988.
Id.; see infra notes 239-40.
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lish an unsupervised home.12 Moreover, the precedents being
set through aggressive litigation" in the federal courts will ap-
ply to unsupervised recovery homes with or without Oxford
House guidance.
This Note will assess the impact of the amended Fair Housing
Act, and its interpretation by the federal courts, on local control
over the regulation and site selection for these unsupervised
recovery homes. In particular it will examine the conflict be-
tween the federal policy of endorsing the concept of unsuper-
vised residential treatment and municipalities' interest in pre-
serving the residential character of single-family neighborhoods.
Unlike foster homes or group homes for the mentally disabled,
unsupervised recovery homes can present problems not based on
unfounded fears and prejudices, but on the realties of drug and
alcohol recovery and the legitimate concerns of residents forced
to bear the burden of a potentially detrimental land use. 4
This Note first will review the nature of single-family zoning,
the development and legislative history of the FHA, and the
corresponding rise in popularity of residential treatment under
the Oxford House model. 5 The Note then will review the lan-
guage of the amended FHA and the principal cases that have
thus far defined the federal statute's limits on control of group
homes through local zoning. Oxford House and similar groups
12. J. PAUL MOLLOY, SELF-RUN, SELF-SUPPORTED HOUSES FOR MORE EFFECTIVE
RECOVERY FROM ALCOHOL AND DRUG ADDICTION 13 (1990).
13. See, e.g., United States v. Village of Palatine, 37 F.3d 1230 (7th Cir. 1994);
City of Edmonds v. Washington State Bldg. Code Council, 18 F.3d 802 (9th Cir.),
cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 417 (1994); St. Louis, 843 F. Supp. 1556; Oxford House,
Inc. v. City of Albany, 819 F. Supp. 1168 (N.D.N.Y. 1993); Oxford House, Inc. v.
Town of Babylon, 819 F. Supp. 1179 (E.D.N.Y. 1993); Oxford House, Inc. v. City of
Va. Beach, 825 F. Supp. 1251 (E.D. Va. 1993); Oxford House, Inc. v. Township of
Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. 450 (D.N.J. 1992); Oxford House-Evergreen v. City of
Plainfield, 769 F. Supp. 1329 (D.N.J. 1991).
14. Ordinarily group homes are distinguished from typical residential housing by
three characteristics: (1) residents are unrelated, (2) supervision by live-in caretakers
or professional staff, and (3) on-site support services. SALSICH, supra note 3, § 7.07.
This Note focuses on the narrower, but rapidly growing, field of unsupervised recov-
ery homes that provide neither staffing nor professional support services. The cases
discussed mostly involve homes for recovering substance abusers. Many were brought
by Oxford House, Inc. or by the Justice Department on behalf of a local Oxford
House.
15. See infra notes 19-74 and accompanying text.
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have attacked a central principle of local ordinances aimed at
preserving single-family neighborhoods-limits on the number of
unrelated people that constitutes a "single family."' 6
Finally, the Note analyzes the conflicting policy arguments: a
policy favoring residential treatment as an effective and econom-
ical aid to the recovery of reformed addicts versus a locality's
interest in maintaining reasonable restrictions in residential
districts. 7 The Note concludes with recommendations for ap-
propriate local regulation designed to permit structured group
homes as of-right uses without eviscerating local zoning codes




Since the advent of zoning, one of its principal purposes has
been the preservation of the single-family neighborhood as one
of the highest uses of land. 9 A frequently-quoted passage from
Justice Douglas describes the virtues of the single-family neigh-
borhood:
A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor
vehicles restricted are legitimate guidelines in a land-use
project addressed to family needs .... The police power is not
confined to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy places.
It is ample to lay out zones where family values, youth val-
ues, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make
the area a sanctuary for people.2"
The first single-family restrictions were aimed mainly at lim-
iting the proliferation of apartments and other multi-family
dwellings. Indeed, early zoning definitions of family frequently
16. See infra notes 75-210 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 211-58 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 259-311 and accompanying text.
19. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365 (1926). Justice Sutherland
wrote that the crux of zoning legislation was the "creation and maintenance of resi-
dential districts, from which business and trade of every sort, including hotels and
apartment houses, are excluded." Id. at 390.
20. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974).
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did not require kinship or other association.21 Instead the focus
was on occupants living as a single housekeeping unit.22 As life-
styles changed, however, an increasing number of localities
sought to limit the definition by excluding or restricting the
number of unrelated people who could constitute a family.23
The Supreme Court upheld such restrictive definitions in Village
of Belle Terre v. Boraas,24 finding the distinction between relat-
ed and unrelated people rationally related to the government's
proffered objective of maintaining the single-family character of
a neighborhood. Later, in Moore v. City of East Cleveland,25 the
Court struck a restrictive definition of family which purported to
limit the types of relations that constituted a "family" under the
local ordinance.26 The plaintiff had been prosecuted for housing
an illegal occupant-her grandson.27 The plurality opinion
found that such restrictions cut too deeply into the sanctity of
the family and did little to further the community objectives of
preventing overcrowding and congestion.2"
With this distinction in place, localities crafted definitions of
family comporting with the Supreme Court's holding.29 Al-
21. 2 ROBERT M. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 9.30 (2d ed. 1976).
22. Id.
23. Id. A typical ordinance limits the family to "one or more persons limited to
the spouse, parents, grandparents, grandchildren, sons, daughters, brothers or sisters
of the owner or tenant." Id. (citing White Plains v. Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d 300 (1974)).
24. Belle Terre, 416 U.S. at 9. The ordinance approved in Belle Terre limited the
number of unrelated people who could constitute a family to two. Id. at 2. The
Court reviewed the ordinance under the rational basis test and found it to be ratio-
nally related to the goal of preserving the single-family character of the neighbor-
hood. Id. at 8-9.
25. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
26. Id. at 496 n.2.
27. Id. at 497.
28. Id. at 499-500.
29. The distinction is typically codified in a municipality's zoning code. For exam-
ple, in Virginia Beach, Virginia, a family is defined as:
(a) An individual living alone in a dwelling unit; or
(b) Any of the following groups of persons, living together and sharing
living areas in a dwelling unit:
(1) Two (2) or more persons related by blood, marriage, adoption, or
approved foster care;
(2) A group of not more than four (4) persons (including servants)
who need not be related by blood, marriage, adoption or approved foster
care.
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though restrictions on family relationships violated fundamental
rights, the Court clearly supported the use of zoning to exclude
congregate living arrangements that were deemed detrimental
to the single-family character of neighborhoods.3"
More restrictive statutes limit the impact of communal living
arrangements among college students and younger people shar-
ing homes in resort areas.31 They also promote permanency and
stability, enhancing the residential character of single family
neighborhoods.32 Unfortunately, localities also use restrictive
ordinances to exclude a variety of beneficial uses, including
group homes for the disabled.3 3 In response to this exclusionary
pressure, advocates for the disabled began to lobby Congress to
amend the FHA to add the handicapped as a protected class.34
Before Congress could act, the Supreme Court decided City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. 35 The case involved the
denial of a use permit to operate a group home for mentally
retarded adults.36 The Fifth Circuit had invalidated the use
VIRGINIA BEACH, VA., CODE app. A § 111 (1994); see also Oxford House-C v. City of
St. Louis, 843 F. Supp. 1556, 1568 (E.D. Mo. 1994) (citing ST. LOUIS, MO., CODE §
26.08.160 (1992)).
30. The Court reaffirmed its support for an unrelated persons restriction in 1984,
dismissing an appeal by group home operators for want of a federal question in
Macon Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. Macon-Bibb County Planning and Zoning
Comm'n, 469 U.S. 802, dismissing appeal from 314 S.E.2d 218 (Ga. 1984). The
Macon home, designed to house four unrelated mentally disabled residents, was
found not to constitute a single-family use by the lower court.
31. 2 ANDERSON, supra note 21, § 9.30.
32. St. Louis, 843 F. Supp. at 1579 ("[Slingle-family-zoning districts in particular,
promote the legitimate governmental interest of maintaining the residential character
of a neighborhood and segregating single families from rooming houses, multi-family
apartments, and commercial or "industrial uses in that same area."); see also Harold
A. Ellis, Comment, Neighborhood Opposition and the Permissible Purposes of Zoning,
7 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 275 (1992) (observing that zoning disputes often center
on maintaining neighborhood "character").
33. Lester D. Steinman, The Effect of Land-Use Restrictions on the Establishment
of Community Residences for the Disabled: A National Study, 19 URB. LAW. 1, 2
(1987).
34. In 1980, the House of Representatives passed the first amendment to propose
adding the handicapped as a protected class under the FHA. The bill failed in the
Senate, however, and languished for nearly a decade until passed by the 100th Con-
gress in 1988. H.R. REP. NO. 711, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2175.
35. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
36. Id. at 435.
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permit restriction, finding that the mentally retarded were a
"quasi-suspect' class" 37 and thus entitled to an intermediate
level of judicial scrutiny.3" The Supreme Court affirmed the
decision, but refused to find the classification suspect. Instead,
the majority's rigorous application of rational basis review re-
jected all seven proffered justifications for the use permit deni-
al.39
Although clearly committed to the plight of the mentally dis-
abled, and to overcoming the "irrational prejudice" that denied
them housing, the Court's decision in Cleburne created confusion
over the proper standard to be applied in equal protection chal-
lenges.4" The deliberate finding that the disabled were not a
"suspect class" deprived them of heightened scrutiny,4 but the
searching analysis of the city's motives gave new teeth to the ra-
tional basis standard. As a result of this confusion, pressure
for congressional action increased, and legislators responded
with the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988.
The Fair Housing Act
The Fair Housing Act was originally passed as Title VIII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1968." It provided protection from dis-
crimination in housing on the basis of race, color, religion, gen-
der, or national origin.' The Act was amended in 1988 to ex-
tend protection to the handicapped.45 The amended FHA makes
it unlawful
37. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. v. City of Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191,-'198 (5th Cir.
1984).
38. Id.
39. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 447-50.
40. Patrick T. Bergin, Note, Exclusionary Zoning Laws: Irrationally-Based Barriers
to Normalization of Mentally Retarded Citizens, 3 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 237,
255 (1987).
41. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446; Bergin, supra note 40, at 255.
42. Bergin, supra note 40, at 255-56; David 0. Stewart, A Growing Equal Pro-
tection Clause?, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1985, at 108, 109-12.
43. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
44. Gender was added as a protected class by the 1974 Amendments to the Fair
Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 808(b)(1)-(3), 88 Stat. 729 (1974) (amending 42
U.S.C. §§ 3604-3606 (1988)).
45. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619"
(current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
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(1) to discriminate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise
make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter
because of a handicap of-
(A) that buyer or renter,
(B) a person residing in or intending to reside in that
dwelling after it is sold, rented, or made available; or
(C) any person associated with that buyer or renter.46
The statutory definition of discrimination includes "a refusal to
make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or
services when such accommodations may be necessary to afford
such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling... ."47
Both the language of the prohibition and the definition of dis-
crimination indicate an intention that the law apply to local
zoning decisions."
In drafting the amendments, Congress relied heavily on the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973.4" It also expressed an intent for
courts to apply the two statutes consistently. ° Not surprisingly,
the courts subsequently extended the coverage of the FHA to
include recovering substance abusers as a protected class." In
addition to case law, the legislative history explicitly supports
the FHA's application to recovering drug addicts and alcohol-
ics.52
46. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1)-(2) (1988) (emphasis added).
47. Id. § 3604(f)(3)(B) (emphasis added).
48. If the language were not plain enough, the report of the House Judiciary
Committee was unequivocal: "The Committee intends that the prohibition against
discrimination against those with handicaps apply to zoning decisions and practices."
H.R. REP. No. 711, supra note 34, at 24, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2185.
49. 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1988 & Sdpp. V 1993).
50. H.R. REP. No. 711, supra note 34, at 22, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
2183 ("The Committee intends that the definition be interpreted consistent with
regulations clarifying the meaning of the similar provision found in Section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act.") (footnote omitted).
51. United States v. Southern Management Corp., 955 F.2d 914 (4th Cir. 1992);
Oxford House-Evergreen v. City of Plainfield, 769 F. Supp. 1329, 1342; see infra
notes 101-17 and accompanying text.
52. The House Report specifically stated that the definition of handicap included
"individuals who have recovered from an addition [sic] or are participating in a
treatment program or self-help group such as Narcotics Anonymous .... Depriving
such individuals housing, or evicting them, would constitute irrational discrimination
that may seriously jeopardize their continued recovery." H.R. REP. NO. 711, supra
note 34, at 22, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2183.
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The passage of the amendments gave group-home operators a
potent new weapon in their fight against restrictive zoning stat-
utes. 3 It also capped a movement toward the mainstreaming of
the disabled that began decades earlier and proved instrumental
in the implementation of a legislative policy specifically directed
at providing low-cost group housing as a partial solution to the
country's growing substance abuse problem.54
The Oxford House Experiment
Deinstitutionalization, or normalization, of the disabled has
been accepted policy since the 1950s.55 According to this theory,
disabled people who cannot live with their families should live
together in a household unit of normal size that provides oppor-
tunities for social interaction in a setting that closely approxi-
mates that of a typical household.56
Such community-based living arrangements have been part of
the effort to treat recovering substance abusers since 1958."7
Such homes have several advantages over traditional in-patient
treatment facilities. The residential setting, usually in quiet
neighborhoods, reduces the temptation to relapse by removing
the addicts from areas of drug trafficking. 8 In addition, the
53. See William Graham, Comment, There Goes the Neighborhood: The Evolution
of "Family" in Local Zoning Ordinances, 9 TOURO L. REV. 699, 715-18 (1993) (dis-
cussing the increased use of FHA remedies by group home advocates in New York
courts).
54. Id.
55. Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Group Homes, Shelters and Congregate Housing:
Deinstitutionalization Policies and the NIMBY Syndrome, 21 REAL PROP. PROB. TR.
J. 413, 416 n.17 (1986).
56. Cindy L. Soper, Note, The Fair Housing Act Amendments of 1988: New Zoning
Rules for Group Homes for the Handicapped, 37 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1033, 1040-41
(1993).
57. See LEWIS YABLONSKY, THE THERAPEUTIc COMMUNITY 17 (1989). The first
therapeutic community, or TC, called Synanon, was established in a Santa Monica,
California, beach house. Like modem recovery homes, it relied on the ability of re-
covering addicts to help themselves through group therapy and a peer-to-peer struc-
ture which gave the patients responsibility for the operation and maintenance of the
home. Id. at 17-26. Unfortunately, the Synanon movement itself was discredited
widely in the 1970s for the cult-like practices of its leader and allegedly exploitative
commercial ventures. See Synanon Church v. United States, 579 F. Supp. 967, 970-
71 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (upholding the revocation of the group's tax-exempt status).
58. MOLLOY, supra note 12, at 16 n.12.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:1467
social structure of the home fosters the interdependence that is
a large factor in the successful recovery programs of Alcoholics
Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous.59
Oxford House is the country's largest developer of unsuper-
vised recovery homes. It was founded in 1975 by Paul Molloy, a
lawyer and recovering alcoholic. 0 Molloy started the first Ox-
ford House out of necessity. After the half-way house facilitating
his own recovery was threatened with closure for lack of funds,
the residents decided to take over the home themselves.61 They
established two simple rules: No resident could drink or take
drugs, and each had to work and pay rent to stay.62 There were
no curfews, no mandatory meetings, no treatment regimen, and
no staff. 3
Despite their success, the growth of group homes under the
Oxford House model was limited mainly to the suburbs around
Washington, D.C., with fewer than twenty homes established in
the first fifteen years after Oxford House's founding." Then, in
1988, Molloy, with the help of friends in Congress, succeeded in
getting federal block grants made contingent on state support
for self-governing group homes patterned after the Oxford House
model.65
59. Both groups follow the "twelve-step" method of recovery, involving admitting
powerlessness over drugs and alcohol and committing to total abstinence. The main
instrument of their success is the weekly AA or NA meeting, at which recovering
addicts support one another in the recovery process. ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS WORLD
SERVICES, INC., ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS 59 (3d ed. 1976).
60. The Oxford House Experiment, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 1989, (Magazine), at
W1S.
61. Id.
62. Id. The basic tenets of Oxford House are remarkably unchanged. The main
principles are self-governance, absolute prohibition of alcohol and drugs, and self-
sufficiency. See OXFORD HOUSE MANUAL 8-14, reprinted in MOLLOY, supra note 12,
at app. C.
63. The fewer the rules, the more likely it will be that a house will be suc-
cessful .... In many alcoholic rehabilitation units, there are rules cover-
ing . . . curfew hours; clean-up details; mandatory attendance at AA
meetings; and other rules almost inherent in institutional living. Oxford
House is not an institution. It is more analogous to a family situation or
a college fraternity or sorority.
OXFORD HOUSE MANUAL, supra note 62, at 13.
64. MOLLOY, supra note 12, at 3-4.
65. 42 U.S.C. § 300x-25 (Supp. V 1993). The act provides that block grants under
1476
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With the support of state start-up grants, and the recent in-
clusion of the handicapped as a protected class under the FHA,
Oxford House experienced tremendous growth and expansion
between 1988 and 1994. More than 500 unsupervised group
homes were established in thirty-five states.6 As the network
grew, so too did the disputes over the proper location of recovery
homes under local zoning codes.
Residents opposed to the facilities have used restrictive family
definitions and safety-related use permit requirements in local
zoning codes to exclude group homes from their neighborhoods.67
Molloy, who runs the national organization, contends that the
definitions should not operate against local Oxford Houses. In a
"Technical Manual" written to help individuals and organizations
interested in starting a recovery home, he claims that a recovery
home is "no different from a biological family." 8 "'Family"' he ar-
gues, "is the proper characterization of an Oxford House. The
members.., behave just like a family and should be treated as
such by every jurisdiction."69 As a result, the new homes "[a]s a
matter of practice, . . . doll not seek prior approval of zoning
regulations before moving into a residential neighborhood.""
the Anti Drug Abuse Act are given only to those states that establish a $100,000
revolving loan fund for the establishment of group homes made to private, non-profit
entities where
(A) the use of alcohol or any illegal drug in the housing program
provided by the program will be prohibited;
(B) any resident of the housing who violates such prohibition will be
expelled from the housing;
(C) the costs of the housing, including fees for rent and utilities, will
be paid by the residents of the housing; and
(D) the residents of the housing will, through a majority vote of the
residents, otherwise establish policies governing residence in the housing,
including the manner in which applications for residence in the housing
are approved.
Id. § 300x-25(a)(6). The fund must provide loans of up to $4000 per home and the
loans must be repaid within two years. Id. § 300x-25(a)(4).
66. Gelernter, supra note 6, at M1.
67. City of Edmonds v. Washington State Bldg. Code Council, 18 F.3d 802 (9th
Cir. 1994); Oxford House-C v. City of St. Louis, 843 F. Supp. 1556 (E.D. Mo.
1994); Oxford House, Inc. v. City of Albany, 819 F. Supp. 1168 (N.D.N.Y. 1993);
Oxford House, Inc. v. City of Va. Beach, 825 F. Supp. 1251 (E.D. Va. 1993).
68. MOLLOY, supra note 12, at 30.
69. Id.
70. Id.; see United States v. Village of Palatine, 37 F.3d 1230, 1234 (7th Cir.
1477
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Not surprisingly, residents in prospective Oxford House neigh-
borhoods view the situation differently.71 Although some have
objected on clearly improper grounds," others raise legitimate
objections based on the character of the recovery home use and
the surreptitious procedure by which the homes locate.73 Not-
withstanding the mandate of the amended FHA, these localities
argue that recovery home operators do not have a blanket ex-
emption from local regulation.74 The following discussion con-
siders the limits on that local regulation through an analysis of
the language and interpretation of the relevant provisions of the
FHA.
THE LIMITS OF LOcAL CONTROL
In the recent past, arguments about what constitutes a single-
family use, and how sites for group homes ought to be selected,
have moved from local city council and zoning board meetings
into the federal courts. Prior to the inclusion of the handicapped
as a protected class under the FHA, group home operators who
were defeated at the local level had to challenge restrictive zon-
ing ordinances on constitutional grounds.75 Because zoning or-
dinances traditionally are accorded a very deferential review by
1994) (Manion, J. concurring).
71. See, e.g., Tom Kennedy, West University and Drug Rehab, HOUS. POST, June
12, 1994, at Cl; Sara Talalay, Town Says Oxford House Doesn't Obey Zoning Rules,
CHI. TRIB., Apr. 19, 1994, at 3; Group Homes Spark Debate over Locations, ST. LOU-
is POST DISPATCH, Mar. 17, 1994, at IA; Home Stands Alone: House for Recovering
Addicts Is Opposed by Neighbors, Officials, NEWSDAY, Oct. 6, 1991, at 1; Audobon
Residents Oppose Home for Recovering Alcoholics, Addicts, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 19,
1990, at B5.
72. See infra notes 127-33 and accompanying text (citing cases).
73. Palatine, 37 F.3d at 1235 (Manion, J., concurring) (recognizing localities' legiti-
mate interests in safety, property rights, and the rights of other group home resi-
dents); Oxford House, Inc. v. City of Va. Beach, 825 F. Supp. 1251, 1262 n.4 (E.D.
Va. 1993); see also Kennedy, supra note 71, at C1 (describing neighbor's surprise at
learning of a local Oxford House by observing a resident who had relapsed running
naked down the street).
74. Palatine, 37 F.3d at 1233-34.
75. Graham, supra note 53, at 700. Most cases were brought on either due pro-
cess or equal protection grounds. Id.
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the courts, these early challenges were difficult to win.76 With
the expansion of FHA protection, Oxford House and other home
operators have proceeded directly to the federal courts for tem-
porary and permanent injunctive relief and, in some cases, dam-
ages.
77
This section of the Note will review the impact of the amend-
ed FHA on local control of recovery home regulation. After a
review of the statutory language itself, it will discuss judicial
interpretations of the FHA by the federal courts. The early in-
terpretations of lower courts have resolved some of the ambigu-
ity in the FHA and clarified the limits of local zoning power to
control recovery home expansion.
The Statutory Language
Group home operators viewed the amended FHA as a useful
tool to combat exclusionary zoning of group homes.8 In fact,
Congress clearly stated its intention that the statute prohibit
special restrictions and criteria that localities apply to exclude
group homes.79
What is less clear is the extent to which the FHA prohibits
the application of neutral laws that have the effect of making it
difficult for recovery homes to operate. 0 One area of confusion
76. Id. The Supreme Court, in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S.
365 (1926), held that zoning regulations did not violate the Due Process Clause
unless they were "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation
to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare." Id. at 395.
77. Until the Supreme Court's decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985), and the amendments to the Fair Housing Act, con-
trol over the location of group homes was almost exclusively a local and state ques-
tion. See SALSICH, supra note 3, § 7.07; see also supra notes 33-45 and accompany-
ing text.
78. See William D. McElyea, The Fair Housing Act Amendments of 1988: Potential
Impact on Zoning Practices Regarding Group Homes for the Handicapped, in 1990
ZONING AND PLANNING LAW HANDBOOK 359 (Mark S. Dennison ed., 1990); Keith
Aoki, Recent Developments-Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 24 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 249 (1989).
79. H.R. REP. No. 711, supra note 34, at 23, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
2184 (stating that the Committee "intend[s] to prohibit special . . . terms or condi-
tions, or denials of service because of an individual's handicap and which have the
effect of excluding, for example, congregate living arrangements for persons with
handicaps").
80. McElyea, supra note 78, at 363.
1479
1480 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:1467
involves the interpretation of the statute's numerous exemp-
tions."1 A few of these exemptions have been asserted in at-
tempts to deny FHA protection to recovery home residents. 2
For example, the statute excludes from the definition of handi-
cap the "current, illegal use of or addiction to a controlled sub-
stance." 3 It also exempts from coverage persons who have been
convicted of the illegal manufacture or distribution of a con-
trolled substance.84 These exemptions have been asserted by
localities seeking to restrict recovery home access to residential
neighborhoods by denying the residents protected status.8 5
The exemption that has been relied upon most frequently by
local officials permits "reasonable ... restrictions regarding the
maximum number of occupants' permitted to occupy a dwell-
ing."86 The meaning of that exemption, however, is subject to
disagreement. The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the exemp-
tion applied to family definitions that limited the number of
unrelated people who could occupy a dwelling.'7 But the Ninth
Circuit disagreed,"8 and the Eleventh Circuit's decision has
been distinguished 9 and criticized9" in district court cases
81. 42 U.S.C. § 3607 (1988). This statute exempts certain housing provided by
religious groups and private clubs, id. § 3607(a), allows restrictions based on maxi-
mum occupancy, id. § 3607(b)(1), and excludes from coverage persons who "ha[ve
been convicted . . . of the illegal manufacture or distribution of a controlled sub-
stance," id. § 3607(4).
82. United States v. Southern Management Corp., 955 F.2d 914, 918 (4th Cir.
1992); Oxford House-Evergreen v. City of Plainfield, 769 F. Supp. 1329, 1342
(D.N.J. 1991).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h).
84. Id. § 3607(4).
85. See infra notes 105-20 and accompanying text.
86. 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b).
87. Elliott v. City of Athens, 960 F.2d 975 (11th Cir. 1992); see infra notes 193-98
and accompanying text.
88. City of Edmonds v. Washington St. Bldg. Code Council, 18 F.3d 802 (9th Cir.),
cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 417 (1994); see infra notes 204-08 and accompanying text.
89. Oxford House v. Town of Babylon, 819 F. Supp. 1179, 1182 n.4 (E.D.N.Y.
1993) (finding Elliott "inapposite" because the family definition did not use a numeri-
cal limit but required a showing of "a relatively permanent household, not a frame-
work for transients or transient living").
90. Oxford House, Inc. v. City of Va. Beach, 825 F. Supp. 1251, 1259 & n.3 (E.D.
Va. 1993) (finding the "reasoning of Elliott unpersuasive" and agreeing with the
Elliott dissent that "it is not possible to interpret the maximum occupancy limitation
provision to cover unrelated persons restrictions"); see Oxford House-C v. City of St.
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with very similar facts. The Supreme Court agreed to resolve
the dispute in its current term.9'
In addition to confusion over the purpose of the exemptions,
the language of the statute is also ambiguous as to the showing
required to prove discrimination. Republican lawmakers, antici-
pating the statute's impact on local zoning, attempted to amend
it in committee to require a showing of discriminatory intent to
invalidate a zoning ordinance. 2 The amendment was defeated,
however, and the Act went into effect with no specified stan-
dard.93 As a consequence, three different tests have emerged.94
Most courts hold that a showing of either discriminatory intent
or discriminatory impact will suffice to prove discrimination.95
A third standard, borrowed from the Rehabilitation Act and appli-
cable only to the handicapped, is "reasonable accommodation."96
Louis, 843 F. Supp. 1556 (E.D. Mo. 1994).
91. City of Edmonds v. Washington State Bldg. Code Council, 115 S. Ct. 417
(1994); see Arguments Before the Court, 63 U.S.L.W. 3679 (Mar. 21, 1995) (noting
oral argument in the Edmonds case was presented on Mar. 1, 1995).
92. H.R. REP. NO. 711, supra note 34, at 89, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
2224 (additional views of Rep. Swindall et al.: "I vote against H.R. 1158 [because] in
its present form, the bill may be used by advocacy groups, federal judges or bureau-
crats to bust local zoning."). President Reagan also voiced his support for the dis-
criminatory intent standard in remarks made during the signing of the legislation.
[T]his bill does not represent any congressional or executive branch en-
dorsement of the notion, expressed in some judicial opinions, that [FHA]
violations may be established by a showing of disparate impact or dis-
criminatory effects of a practice that is taken without discriminatory
intent. [The FHA] speaks only to intentional discrimination.
Remarks on signing the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 24 WEEKLY CopIP.
PREs. Doc. 1140, 1141 (Sept. 13, 1988).
93. The language of the Act is silent with regard to the standard of proof re-
quired to show discrimination. The provisions relating to the handicapped, however,
require a "reasonable accommodation" to promote access to housing. 42 U.S.C.
§ 3604 (1988).
94. St. Louis, 843 F. Supp. at 1575; see ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMI-
NATION: LAW & LITIGATION § 11.5(3)(c) (1994).
95. Doe v. City of Butler, 892 F.2d 315, 323 (3d Cir. 1989); Oxford
House-Evergreen v. City of Plainfield, 769 F. Supp. 1329, 1343 (D.N.J. 1991);
Baxter v. City of Belleville, 720 F. Supp. 720, 732 (S.D. Ill. 1989). The standard is a
familiar one from actions under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. See, e.g., Keith v.
Volpe, 858 F.2d 467, 482-84 (9th Cir. 1988); Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of
Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 934-37 (2d Cir.), affd per curiam, 488 U.S. 15 (1988). It
had been applied under the FHA in cases of racial discrimination and is thus com-
patible with congressional intent that the statute be interpreted consistently with
earlier statutes.
96. Reasonable accommodation has a well-developed history in the case law and
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:1467
The lack of clarity regarding the applicable standard, coupled
with the ambiguous language of the exception provisions," has
made the area of zoning for group homes one of the most fre-
quently litigated aspects of the expanded coverage for. the handi-
capped under the FHA.9" The drafters' decision to delegate en-
forcement responsibility for zoning and land-use cases to the
Justice Department, rather than the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD), further clouds the interpretation.99
Because HUD regulations issued to cover the implementation of
the rest of the FHA deliberately excluded zoning challenges, the
need for judicial interpretation is particularly acute.'
The Oxford House Cases
Litigation to interpret the limits that the amended FHA plac-
es on unsupervised recovery homes has addressed three basic
questions with varying degrees of clarity. The first question is
whether the residents are handicapped within the meaning of
the FHA. Although courts generally agree that the Act protects
recovering addicts, the exemptions and exclusions related to
current and former drug problems raise questions about the
extent of drug-related disabilities.
Next, courts have considered the required showing to support
a finding of discrimination under the amended FHA. This analy-
sis involves a review of challenged zoning practices under the
discriminatory intent, discriminatory impact, and reasonable
the journals. See, e.g., Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397
(1979); Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Medicine, 932 F.2d 19 (1st Cir. 1991); Denny
Chin, Discrimination Against the Handicapped: The Duty of Reasonable Accomodation
[sic], in PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY, FORTY-SECOND ANNUAL NATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON LABOR §§ 14.01-.05 (Bruno Stein ed., 1989); Andrew Waugh, Case
Comment, 25 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 186 (1991).
97. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
98. SCHVEMM, supra note 94, § 11.5(3)(c).
99. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(g)(2)(c) (requiring the Secretary of HUD to refer land-use and
zoning matters directly to the Attorney General for investigation and prosecution).
100. SCHWEMM, supra note 94, § 11.5(3)(c) n.287 (noting that the statute's provision
for Justice Department prosecution of land-use cases rendered HUD regulations inap-
propriate for this area).
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accommodation tests. Finally, courts are divided over the inter-
pretation of the statute's exemption for maximum occupancy
restrictions. Because restrictive definitions of family are an
important obstacle for recovery homes seeking unrestricted ac-
cess to single-family districts, the interpretation of this exemp-
tion is critical to a proper application of the statute.
Recovering Alcoholics and Addicts Are a Protected Class
The federal courts have little difficulty finding that recovery
home residents are a protected class under the amended
FHA.'01 This interpretation is consistent with the clear intent
of Congress, both by specific reference in the report of the House
Judiciary Committee"0 2 and by the provision that the Act be
interpreted consistently with the Rehabilitation Act."03 Courts
also apply the definition of handicap in the statute to find re-
covering alcoholics "substantially limit[ed in] one or more of
such person's major life activities."0 4 Parties seeking to limit
the Act's application, however, argue that recovery home resi-
dents are not protected because of current or former drug prob-
lems. To date, courts have not been receptive to this argument.
In United States v. Southern Management Corp.,"°5 for exam-
ple, after finding residents of a recovery home "handicapped"
within the meaning of the statute,0 6 the Fourth Circuit con-
101. United States v. Southern Management Corp., 955 F.2d 914, 918 (4th Cir.
1992); Oxford House, Inc. v. Township of Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. 450, 459 (D.N.J.
1991); United States v. Borough of Audobon, 797 F. Supp. 353, 358 (D.N.J. 1991).
102. H.R. REP. No. 711, supra note 34, at 22, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
2183 ("[Ilndividuals who have a record of drug use or addiction but who do not
currently use illegal drugs would continue to be protected . . ").
103. The Rehabilitation Act had been extended to cover recovering substance
abusers before the FHA was amended. See, e.g., Rodgers v. Lehman, 869 F.2d 253,
258 (4th Cir. 1989); Sullivan v. City of Pittsburgh, 811 F.2d 171, 182 (3d Cir. 1987);
Crewe v. United States Office of Personnel Management, 834 F.2d 140, 141-42 (8th
Cir. 1987).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h)(1) (1988).
105. 955 F.2d 914 (4th Cir. 1992).
106. A bootstrapping argument succeeded in Southern Management. The court held
that recovery home residents were handicapped because they were denied housing as
a result of their status. The denial of housing that formed the basis of the suit
constituted a "substantial impairment" of their ability to care for themselves. Id. at
918; cf United States v. Borough of Audobon, 797 F. Supp. 353 (D.N.J. 1991) (find-
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:1467
ducted an analysis of the Act's legislative history to determine
that the exception for current use or addiction to illegal drugs
did not apply to recovering addicts not currently using
drugs.' °7 In addition to the House Committee Report filed with
the legislation,' the court relied on Congress' definition of
handicap in the more recently passed Americans with Disabili-
ties Act (ADA) to conclude that the exemption did not apply to
people currently recovering from addiction as long as they were
not using illegal drugs presently.0 9
In Oxford House-Evergreen v. City of Plainfield,"' the city
also argued that the plaintiffs were not handicapped within the
meaning of the statute because they fell into one of the statutory
exemptions in the law. The exemptions deny protection to any-
one who is a current user of illegal drugs,"' has a prior convic-
tion for the sale or distribution of drugs,"' or constitutes a di-
rect threat to the health or safety of the neighborhood or proper-
ty of others."' The city pointed out that thirteen of the twenty
residents in Oxford House-Evergreen had left in the past year,
nine as a result of relapse."' The court found the prior relaps-
es by residents who were subsequently forced out, per Oxford
House policy, proved nothing with regard to the current and pro-
spective residents of the recovery home. It then dismissed all
ing Oxford House residents handicapped because they are unable to live indepen-
dently).
107. Southern Management, 955 F.2d at 922-23.
108. The House Report emphasized that "'the amendment [was] intended to exclude
current abusers and current addicts of illegal drugs from protection .... The Com-
mittee does not intend to exclude individuals who have recovered from an addition
[sic] or are participating in a treatment program or a self-help group.'" Id. at 921
(quoting H.R. REP. NO. 711, supra note 34, at 22, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
2183).
109. Id. at 922 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(c) (1991)). In the ADA, Congress made
explicit the only definition of drug dependence disabilities that is consistent with the
legislative history and plain language of the FHA by specifically protecting sober
addicts who are participating in a recovery program. Id.
110. 769 F. Supp. 1329 (D.N.J. 1991).
111. Id. at 1342 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h) (1988)).
112. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(4) (1988)); see also id. at 1343 (finding the city's
speculation with regard to the likelihood of prior convictions insufficient to establish
that residents are not handicapped under the Act).
113. Id. at 1342 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(9) (1988)).
114. Id.
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three of the city's arguments and suggested the accusations
themselves could be evidence of discriminatory intent."5
These cases indicate the courts' reluctance to apply the ex-
emptions to defeat sincere attempts at recovery by former drug
and alcohol abusers. Although this result is understandable, per-
haps even laudable, it presents issues of interpretation that
complicate the regulation of recovery homes. For example, be-
cause the statute exempts from coverage those with prior convic-
tions for the sale or manufacture of illegal drugs, should a locali-
ty be permitted to inquire into such convictions among proposed
recovery home residents?"6
In addition, because addiction is not as readily identifiable as
other handicaps, does a locality have an interest in documenting
the extent of prior treatment?"' A related and more difficult
issue is raised when a disabled recovery home resident makes
the transition out of protected status. As one court has observed,
"[w]hether former addiction to drugs or alcohol qualifies as a
handicap is not open to as easy a determination as [Oxford
House] would have this court believe.""' By extension of the
Fourth Circuit's reasoning in Southern Management, it may be
that as long as a resident derives benefit from a group living
arrangement, she will remain handicapped within the meaning
of the Act. Moreover, because the Act protects those who are
merely "regarded as having"" a disability, defining who is en-
titled to its protection (and for how long) presents even more
difficult challenges for local regulators. Later decisions accept
that the FHA covers recovering addicts and alcoholics.2 Un-
115. Id. at 1343 n.16.
116. See United States v. Southern Management Corp., 955 F.2d 914, 917 (4th Cir.
1992). The district court in Southern Management authorized discovery on this issue
but limited the inquiry to the convictions specified in the exemption and redacted
individual names to foreclose independent investigation by the defendant.
117. The ADA definition of drug-related disability relied upon by the Fourth Circuit
in Southern Management provides that addicts who currently are not using drugs
are part of a protected class if (1) they have completed a rehabilitation program, (2)
they are enrolled in a rehabilitation program, or (3) they are erroneously regarded
as continuing to use drugs. Id. at 922 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(c) (Supp. III 1991)).
118. Oxford House, Inc. v. City of Albany, 819 F. Supp. 1168, 1175 n.5 (N.D.N.Y.
1993).
119. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h)(3) (1988).
120. See, e.g., Oxford House, Inc. v. City of Va. Beach, 825 F. Supp. 1251, 1257
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fortunately, the courts have provided little guidance in defining
the limits of the disability.
Proving Discrimination under the FHA
Because recovering drug addicts and alcoholics are newly
protected classes under the amended FHA, their ability to win
zoning challenges has increased dramatically. Instead of show-
ing that the regulation in question is not rationally related to a
legitimate state interest, 2' recovery home residents need only
show that it discriminates against them as a result of their
status. This section of the Note considers how such discrimina-
tion is measured. The statutory language is ambiguous with
regard to the specific showing required to prove discrimina-
tion,'22 and courts have applied any of three tests to scrutinize
local regulations: discriminatory intent, discriminatory impact,
and failure to make reasonable accommodation.
Discriminatory Intent
Statutes passed or enforced solely for the purpose of excluding
individuals based on their handicap violate the FHA. 2' "Inten-
tional discrimination can include actions motivated by stereo-
types, unfounded fears, misperceptions, and 'archaic attitudes,'
as well as simple prejudice about people with disabilities."'24
(E.D. Va. 1993) ("In light of [Southern Management's] holding that recovering former
alcohol and drug abusers who were denied housing opportunities qualified as
'handicapped' under the Fair Housing Act, the parties do not dispute that the Fair
Housing Act applies to plaintiffs and the members of the group homes they oper-
ate."); Oxford House, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 819 F. Supp. 1179, 1182 (E.D.N.Y.
1993) ("It is well established that individuals recovering from drug or alcohol addic-
tion are handicapped under the FHA.") (citations omitted).
121. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985).
Although the Court in Cleburne struck the zoning ordinance, as applied to restrict a
group home for the mentally ill, they refused to grant protected class status to the
disabled. Id. at 439-46. Instead they subjected the ordinance to rigorous application
of the rational basis test. Id. at 448-50; see also supra notes 35-42 and accompany-
ing text.
122. See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
123. 42 U.S.C. § 3615 (1988) ("[Any law of a State, a political subdivision, or other
such jurisdiction that purports to require or permit any action that would be a dis-
criminatory housing practice under this subchapter shall to that extent be invalid.").
124. Oxford House-C v. City of St. Louis, 843 F. Supp. 1556, 1575-76 (E.D. Mo.
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Discriminatory intent is alleged most frequently when local
officials selectively enforce use permit requirements to exclude
groups of handicapped individuals.'25 Denial of those permits
based, even partially, on discriminatory motives violates the
statute.126
Sometimes recovery homes face blatant discrimination, evi-
denced by comments of officials during public hearings or meet-
ings or indicated by public enforcement action taken solely in
response to local opposition arising from unfounded fears or
prejudice. In a New Jersey case brought by the operator of a
proposed home for mentally ill chemical abusers, 27 after the
plaintiffs appeal of the zoning denial was deferred, the mayor of
the township was quoted as saying: "The war continues. An
adjournment like this is a victory. Just like last month when
they didn't get their papers in on time. Every month that we
last and that doesn't proceed we're ahead." 2 ' The Town news-
letter was even more explicit:
The Township is supporting the efforts of more than 300
area residents who have joined forces to stop the State of
New Jersey and Easter Seal from opening a half-way house
for mentally ill drug addicts.... Neighbors and town officials
believe it is morally wrong and have vowed to stop this half-
way house from opening.29
1994) (citing School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 279 (1987)).
125. See, e.g., Oxford House-Evergreen v. City of Plainfield, 769 F. Supp. 1329
(D.N.J. 1991). Most of the litigation involves permits that are required for all similar
uses by unrelated people (boarding houses, group homes, fraternities, sororities, and
other congregate living arrangements). The plain language of the statute indicates
that a permit requirement focused solely on the protected status would be invalid.
See also H.R. REP. No. 711, supra note 34, at 24, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
2185 ("Another method of making housing unavailable to people with disabilities has
been the application or enforcement of otherwise neutral rules and regulations on
health, safety, and land-use in a manner which discriminates against people with
disabilities .... [Tihese and similar practices would be prohibited.").
126. St. Louis, 843 F. Supp. at 1576 ([Ilt is not necessary that plaintiffs prove
that defendant's actions were motivated by a malicious desire to discriminate. It is
enough that the actions were motivated by or based on consideration of the protect-
ed status itself."); Oxford House, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 819 F. Supp. 1179, 1184-
85 (E.D.N.Y. 1993); Plainfield, 769 F. Supp. at 1343.
127. Easter Seal Soc'y v. Township of N. Bergen, 798 F. Supp. 228 (D.N.J. 1992).
128. Id. at 232.
129. Id.
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Cases like this are easy for the federal courts enforcing the
FHA. Unfortunately, they are not uncommon.'30
Discriminatory intent also is alleged when group homes are
denied use permits as a result of community protest. In Oxford
House-C v. City of St. Louis,13' for example, the court found
the city's enforcement actions were carried out "in response to
neighborhood and community fears and concerns about 'some
sort of drug rehab' house ... .""' Despite testimony from city
officials sympathetic to the recovery home mission, the court
concluded the city's enforcement was discriminatory, holding
specifically: "Intentional discrimination does not require person-
al animosity or ill will-it is sufficient that defendant treated
plaintiffs unfavorably because of their handicap."'33
This broad interpretation of discriminatory intent poses spe-
cial problems for local zoning officials in light of the Oxford
House policy of evading local restrictions. Because the new home
operators are encouraged to locate facilities without regard to
local zoning restrictions,'34 neighbors understandably complain
and notify government officials. Subsequent enforcement efforts
are branded discriminatory based on the motivation of complain-
ing neighbors, despite the fact that local authorities were pre-
empted from appropriate regulation by the surreptitious location
of the facility.
13 5
130. See, e.g., Plainfield, 769 F. Supp. at 1343 (zoning officer first permitted home,
then reversed determination after citizen complaints at council meeting); United
States v. Borough of Audobon, 797 F. Supp. 353, 360 (D.N.J. 1991) (quoting the
mayor: '[Tihere is nothing more that I would like to do than to just come in and
just tell these people you have until noon to get out of town."); Babylon, 819 F.
Supp. at 1184 (quoting a citizen of East Farmingdale: "I don't want [my son] sub-
jected to irrational, unpredicted [sic] behavior from people.").
131. 843 F. Supp. 1556 (E.D. Mo. 1994).
132. Id. at 1576.
133. Id. at 1577.
134. MOLLOY, supra note 12, at 30; see also United States v. Village of Palatine, 37
F.3d 1230, 1234-35 (7th Cir. 1994) (Manion, J., concurring).
135. Palatine, 37 F.3d at 1235.
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Discriminatory Impact
The second standard applied by courts for proof of discrimina-
tion under the Act involves facially-neutral'36 ordinances that
are enforced uniformly but are alleged to violate the FHA by
having a discriminatory effect on a protected class. In order to
prevail on a discriminatory impact theory, the party challenging
the ordinance first must show a discriminatory impact on the
protected class. The burden then shifts to the locality to show
that the impact is necessary to meet a legitimate state inter-
est.1
37
Many local zoning restrictions place disparate burdens on
congregate living arrangements, most commonly in the form of
restrictive family definitions 3 ' and building codes that impose
special burdens on group-living arrangements regardless of
handicap status.3 9 These restrictions have been invalidated
widely by federal courts interpreting the FHA in the recovery
home context.
In Albany, New York, the city's so called Grouper Law limits
to three the number of unrelated people who can constitute a
family.'4 ° In a suit for a preliminary injunction prohibiting its
enforcement against a local Oxford House, the district judge,
without deciding the issue, found sufficient evidence of discrimi-
136. Occasionally, statutes are found facially discriminatory. See Horizon House
Developmental Servs., Inc. v. Township of Upper Southampton, 804 F. Supp. 683
(E.D. Pa. 1992). In Horizon House, the challenged ordinance imposed a 1000 foot
separation requirement between group homes where "permanent care or professional
supervision" was present. Id. at 694. The court found that this requirement created
an explicit classification because only disabled people would require such special
care. As a result the statute was facially discriminatory. The court also rejected the
city's justification for the ordinance-the avoidance of group home "clustering"-as
not rationally related to any legitimate interest. Id. at 694-95. But see Familystyle of
St. Paul, Inc. v. City of St. Paul, 923 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1991) (upholding a similar
spacing requirement).
137. Oxford House-C v. City of St. Louis, 843 F. Supp. 1556, 1577 (E.D. Mo.
1994).
138. See supra notes 21-32 and accompanying text.
139. E.g., United States v. Village of Palatine, 3 Am. Disabilities Dec. (Law. Co-op)
271 (N.D. Ill. 1993), adopted, No. 93-C-2154, 1993 WL 462848 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 9,
1993), vacated, 37 F.3d 1230 (7th Cir. 1994).
140. Oxford House, Inc. v. City of Albany, 819 F. Supp. 1168, 1176 (N.D.N.Y.
1993).
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natory impact to award relief "on this ground alone." 4 ' The
city had argued that the limit did not have a disparate impact
because the residents could live next door or in a multi-family
dwelling to achieve the six persons necessary for an Oxford
House charter. "2 Beyond that, their need to live in larger
groups was asserted to be financial and unrelated to their handi-
cap. 143
In Oxford House-C v. City of St. Louis'" the court easily
found the city's three-person limit on unrelated householders
had a disparate impact on Oxford House residents.'45 There,
however, the city had recently passed a group home exception to
the zoning ordinance permitting group homes of up to eight to
operate as of-right uses.'46 The court found the new law did
not cure the discrimination "[b]ecause Oxford Houses typically
require more than eight residents ... to operate viably from
both a financial and therapeutic viewpoint." "7 After concluding
that the St. Louis ordinances at issue did have a disparate im-
pact, and that the city had a legitimate interest in preserving
"the residential character of [the] neighborhood,' the court
nonetheless found both ordinances discriminatory because they
were not "necessary" to meet the goal of preserving residential
character.'49 Specifically, the court found that alternative
means for meeting the goal would have had a less discriminato-
ry effect. It suggested a dispersion requirement and the creation
of a conditional use for homes exceeding the city's eight-person
limit. 15
0
Non-numerical, "functional" definitions of family also have
been challenged under a disparate impact theory. In Oxford
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1170.
143. Id. at 1171; see also Palatine, 3 Am. Disabilities Dec. at 298 (finding six to
eight residents sufficient to fulfill Oxford House's therapeutic mission).
144. 843 F. Supp. 1556 (E.D. Mo. 1994).
145. Id. at 1578.
146. Id. at 1578-79.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1579.
149. Id. at 1579-80.
150. Id. Both suggestions are incorporated in this Note's proposed recovery home
licensing scheme. See infra notes 263-311 and accompanying text.
1490
1995] LOCAL CONTROL OVER GROUP HOME REGULATION 1491
House-Evergreen v. City of Plainfield,5' for example, the fam-
ily definition required unrelated people to meet a "functional
equivalent" definition of family that focused on permanency and
stability."2 In addition to evidence of intentional discrimina-
tion in its enforcement, the district court found it had a dispa-
rate impact because recovering alcoholics and addicts may "nev-
er be perceived as 'stable' or 'permanent' by communities that
object to their presence.""5 3 In a footnote, the court questioned
whether furthering "permanence" was a legitimate goal for zon-
ing ordinances to further.' Likewise, in Oxford House, Inc. v.
Township of Cherry Hill,'55 the court found discriminatory a
definition of family that required unrelated groups to apply for a
Certificate of Occupancy and defend their "permanency and
stability."55 Both courts concluded the localities failed to estab-
lish that their enforcement actions were based on legitimate,
non-discriminatory reasons.'57
In United States v. Village of Palatine,' the village main-
tained restrictions for group homes that required them to meet
certain heightened, building-safety guidelines including self-clos-
151. 769 F. Supp. 1329 (D.N.J. 1991).
152. Id. at 1333. The Plainfield ordinance described a family as:
One (1) or more persons living together as a single non-profit housekeep-
ing unit whose relationship is of a permanent and domestic character, as
distinguished from fraternities, sororities, societies, clubs, associations .... All
commercial residences, non-familial institutional uses, boarding homes and
other such occupancies shall be excluded from one-family zones.
Id. (citing PLAINFIELD, N.J., ZONING CODE § 17.3-1(17)).
153. Id. at 1344.
154. Id. at 1336 n.6.
155. 799 F. Supp. 450 (D.N.J. 1992); see also Cherry Hill Township v. Oxford
House, Inc., 621 A.2d 952 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993) (reaching a similar re-
sult).
156. Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. at 462.
157. The cases were both brought in New Jersey, where the Supreme Court of New
Jersey has specifically approved the concept of permanency and stability as a legiti-
mate goal for zoning. Berger v. State, 364 A.2d 993 (N.J. 1976). In these cases,
however, the courts concluded that the local process implementing that policy was
impermissible. Plainfield, 769 F. Supp. at 1344 (finding permanence a "pretext" for
underlying discrimination); Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. at 462 (finding family defini-
tion discriminatorily applied).
158. 3 Am. Disabilities Dec. (Law. Co-op) 271 (N.D. Ill. 1993), adopted, No. 93-C-
2154, 1993 WL 462848 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 9, 1993), vacated, 37 F.2d 1230 (7th Cir.
1994).
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ing doors, deadbolt locks, and fire-safety enhancements.'59 The
district court 6 ° found that, as applied to Oxford House, the
rules had a discriminatory impact because Oxford House resi-
dents were required to live in group arrangements to facilitate
their recovery.161 The court went on to conclude that the vil-
lage had not met its burden of showing the restrictions were
necessary to meet the legitimate safety interests that justified
the statutes.'6 ' According to the court, the code requirements
were not necessary in Oxford House's case because the residents
"share a great deal more responsibility for one another than do
typical rooming house residents. Similarly, because the resi-
dents ... make and enforce house rules, concerns about such
matters.., might be addressed short of treating the residence
as a rooming house for fire code purposes." 6'
These cases illustrate the broad sweep of the amended FHA in
recovery home cases. Although courts do not question the legiti-
macy of governmental interests in neighborhood character
6 1
and residential safety,'65 the means chosen to achieve those
goals will be scrutinized carefully. In the recovery home context,
rules designed for traditional group homes or other congregate
living arrangements frequently do not advance governmental
interests. Local regulators seeking to regain some measure of
control must establish a framework for regulation consistent
with the population being regulated or find themselves without
an enforcement vehicle.
159. Id. at 287.
160. Although the district court opinion was vacated by the Seventh Circuit, Pal-
atine, 37 F.3d 1230, the detailed findings of fact accompanying the lower court's
grant of a preliminary injunction are still useful for an analysis of the special prob-
lems posed by building code requirements created for other congregate living ar-
rangements, see Palatine, 3 Am. Disabilities Dec. at 274-89.
161. Palatine, 3 Am. Disabilities Dec. at 294.
162. Id. at 299. The village pointed out that such regulations were imposed on
group living arrangements where the residents were likely to be less familiar with
the building. But the court relied on the Oxford House structure and testimony at
trial that indicated the recovery home residents were not likely to view their safety
responsibilities any less seriously than the nuclear family.
163. Id. at 296.
164. Oxford House-C v. City of St. Louis, 843 F. Supp. 1556, 1579 (E.D. Mo.
1994).
165. Palatine, 3 Am. Disabilities Dec. at 295-96.
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Reasonable Accommodation
The third aspect of the recovery home argument for protection
under the FHA is unique to the protected class of the handi-
capped. The FHA requires a "reasonable accommodation" if such
is necessary to afford an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a
dwelling.6 ' The phrase "reasonable accommodation" is fre-
quently invoked by Oxford House. When faced with a local zon-
ing challenge, instead of applying for a use permit or variance, it
requests a "reasonable accommodation" in the local ordinance to
permit them to continue to operate.'67
Reasonable accommodation is the strongest of the three stan-
dards, as it purports to grant to the handicapped not only equal
protection but a preferred status in housing discrimination
claims. 8' The district court in Oxford House-C v. City of St.
Louis"'69 held that an accommodation is reasonable if it would
not require a fundamental alteration in the nature of a program
and would not impose undue financial or administrative burdens
on a municipality.
1 70
In those decisions that have addressed reasonable accommo-
dation, the grant of a use permit or variance to allow a group
home to operate is usually the objective.'17 In St. Louis, for ex-
ample, the court found that Oxford House residents could not
"lawfully be required to attempt those procedures."'72 The
hearing process associated with variance and conditional use
applications required notice and an opportunity for public com-
ment that, according to the court, "stigmatizes [residents], per-
petuates their self-contempt, and increases the stress which can
166. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) (1988).
167. See Oxford House v. City of Va. Beach, 825 F. Supp. 1251, 1256 (E.D. Va.
1993); Oxford House v. Township of Babylon, 819 F. Supp. 1179, 1185 (E.D.N.Y.
1993); Oxford House v. City of Albany, 819 F. Supp. 1168, 1171 (N.D.N.Y. 1993).
168. See Elliott v. City of Athens, 960 F.2d 975, 987 (11th Cir. 1992) (Kravitch, J.,
dissenting); SCiWEMM, supra note 94, § 11.5(3)(c).
169. 843 F. Supp. 1556 (E.D. Mo. 1994).
170. Id. at 1581 (citing Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397
(1979)).
171. See United States v. Village of Palatine, 37 F.3d 1230 (7th Cir. 1994); Virginia
Beach, 825 F. Supp. at 1254; St. Louis, 843 F. Supp. at 1581.
172. St. Louis, 843 F. Supp. at 1581.
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so easily trigger relapse."173
A similar result was reached on identical facts by the district
court in United States v. Village of Palatine.114 In Palatine, the
trial court reluctantly found the enforcement of the village's
application procedure was potentially futile, and its refusal to
waive the process was sufficient to warrant a preliminary in-
junction.'17 On appeal, however, the Seventh Circuit vacated
the preliminary injunction granted by the lower court and or-
dered the case dismissed.'7' The circuit court agreed with vil-
lage officials that the special use permit process was not, in
itself, a failure to make reasonable accommodation.'77 It noted
the finding of the magistrate judge below that there was no
requirement that residents actually attend the hearing. 7'
More importantly, the court recognized that "[p]ublic input is an
important aspect of municipal decision making,"'79 and the
FHA did not require courts to impose a "blanket requirement
that cities waive their public notice and hearing requirements in
all cases involving the handicapped."'
The Seventh Circuit relied, in part, on precedent from an
Oxford House case in the eastern district of Virginia. There the
district court refused to consider Oxford House's claims because
of lack of ripeness.'8 ' Oxford House had alleged that the city's
use permit requirement, which was imposed on all groups of
unrelated people larger than four,"2 should be waived as a
reasonable accommodation under the Act. It argued that the
mere requirement of applying for such a permit would subject
173. Id. at 1582 (citations omitted).
174. 3 Am. Disabilities Dec. (Law. Co-op) 271, 297 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
175. Id. at 299-300.
176. United States v. Village of Palatine, 37 F.3d 1230, 1234
(7th Cir. 1994).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1233.
179. Id. at 1234.
180. Id. In a concurring opinion, Judge Manion chastised Oxford House for its
"high handed" policy of ignoring local zoning requirements. Id. at 1235 (Manion, J.,
concurring).
181. Oxford House v. City of Va. Beach, 825 F. Supp. 1251, 1253 (E.D. Va. 1993).
182. The Virginia Beach zoning ordinance, like others in Virginia, contained an
exception for group homes of eight or fewer residents that were licensed by the
state. VIRGINIA BEACH, VA., CODE § 111 app. A (1994).
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residents to public humiliation detrimental to their recovery. 83
The court disagreed. As in Palatine, the case was dismissed
without prejudice until the city was given the opportunity to
rule on a permit application."M
District Judge Payne elaborated on the concept of reasonable
accommodation:
[I]nherent in the concept of "reasonable accommodation,"...
is that the interest of, and benefit to, handicapped individu-
als in securing equal access to housing must be balanced
against the interest of, and burden to, municipalities in mak-
ing the requested accommodation... . In requiring reason-
able accommodation, therefore, Congress surely did not man-
date a blanket waiver of all facially neutral zoning policies
and rules.... Moreover, the need for such balancing is evi-
dent in the context of land use and zoning ordinances, where
cities have important interests in regulating traffic, popula-
tion density and services to ensure the safety and comfort of
all citizens...."
The courts in Palatine and Virginia Beach correctly concluded
that the requested "accommodation" is not the summary admis-
sion of a group home, which may or may not be required by the
FHA, but, rather, a fundamental alteration of the notice and
comment decision making which has characterized zoning proce-
dure for decades. 6 Both decisions recognize localities' legiti-
mate interest in accountability. Whether or not a jurisdiction
may restrict the placement of a recovery home, it should be
allowed to impose some level of regulation to ensure that recov-
ery home residents are entitled to their special status and to
protect the legitimate interests of the surrounding community.
The Meaning of "Maximum Occupancy"
The final important judicial interpretation concerns the mean-
ing of an FHA statutory exemption for "maximum occupancy"
restrictions. The first federal appellate court to interpret the
183. Virginia Beach, 825 F. Supp. at 1262.
184. Id. at 1265.
185. Id. at 1261.
186. DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 6.69 (3d ed. 1993).
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rule concluded it would apply to sustain restrictive family defini-
tions in zoning codes that prohibited unrelated individuals from
sharing a single-family home.'87 The Ninth Circuit, however,
has reached the opposite conclusion, and other district court
decisions exploring the legislative history of the act agree. 8
The Supreme Court agreed to resolve the issue in its Spring
1995 Term. 9
The dispute centers on the meaning of section 3607(b)(1) of
the FHA, which provides that the statute shall not limit "the
applicability of any reasonable local, State, or Federal. restric-
tions regarding the maximum number of occupants permitted to
occupy a dwelling."90 The legislative history is not specific
with regard to the meaning of this exemption, 9' and two con-
trary interpretations have been proposed. The question is im-
portant because much of the legitimate dispute over the regula-
tion of recovery homes centers around the intensive use made by
residents. The typical Oxford House, for example, has ten or
more adult residents, sleeping two to a room."2
The Eleventh Circuit was the first appellate court to interpret
187. Elliott v. City of Athens, 960 F.2d 975 (11th Cir. 1992).
188. See infra text accompanying notes 200-08.
189. The Court accepted the Edmonds case for review in October, 1994. City of
Edmonds v. Washington State Bldg. Code Council, 115 S. Ct. 417 (1994). Oral argu-
ment was presented on March 1, 1995. See Arguments Before the Court, 63 U.S.L.W.
3679 (Mar. 21, 1995).
190. 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(1) (1988).
191. The House Report states: "Section 6(d) amends Section 807 to make additional
exemptions relating to the familial status provisions. These provisions are not intend-
ed to limit the applicability of any reasonable local, State or Federal restrictions on
the maximum number of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling unit." H.R. REP.
NO. 711, supra note 34, at 31, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2192 (second em-
phasis added). This is almost exactly how the statute reads. The report continues:
A number of jurisdictions limit the number of occupants per unit based
on a minimum number of square feet in the unit or the sleeping areas of
the unit. Reasonable limitations by governments would be allowed to con-
tinue, as long as they were applied to all occupants, and did not operate
to discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin,
handicap or familial status.
Id.
192. See Oxford House-C v. City of St. Louis, 843 F. Supp. 1556, 1563-64 (E.D.
Mo. 1994). Although the average number is ten, over 80% of the Oxford Houses
contain more than eight residents, and some have as many as 20 residents. See
MOLLOY, supra note 12, at 13.
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the maximum occupancy exemption. In Elliott v. City of Ath-
ens,'93 the court upheld a local ordinance that limited the num-
ber of unrelated people constituting a single family to four.'94
The case involved an application by a recovery-home operator,
Potter's House, to run a home for twelve recovering addicts.'95
The majority found the local ordinance, which was passed to re-
duce overcrowding in the college town, a "reasonable" maximum
occupancy regulation exempt from the statute.
196
The majority opinion relied on the distinction drawn by the
Supreme Court in Belle Terre and Moore,'9' between restric-
tions on occupancy by unrelated people and those on related
families. It concluded that Congress could not have intended to
invalidate the numerous ordinances that included such restric-
tions in their zoning code as a legitimate means of controlling
density.9 '
The court in Elliott, however, has not been followed, and low-
er courts in other circuits have criticized its rationale.'99 In
Virginia Beach, Virginia, when Oxford House tried to establish
four recovery homes in violation of the city's unrelated persons
restriction, the court, in dicta, dismissed the reasoning of Elliott
as unpersuasiveY0 0  It cited the Elliott dissent of Judge
Kravitch as the more compelling interpretation.'
Whether restrictions on the number of unrelated persons are
constitutional does not control whether such restrictions
constitute maximum occupancy limitations under the Fair
Housing Act. Moreover, in discussing the relevant legislative
history, the majority in Elliott ignores the unambiguous
statement that maximum occupancy limitations are permissi-
ble if "applied to all occupants," without qualification.2 2
193. 960 F.2d 975 (11th Cir. 1992).
194. Id. at 983.
195. Id. at 977.
196. Id. at 984.
197. Id. at 980; see supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text.
198. Elliott, 960 F.2d at 980.
199. Oxford House-C v. City of St. Louis, 843 F. Supp. 1556, 1574 (E.D. Mo.
1994); Oxford House v. City of Va. Beach, 825 F. Supp. 1251, 1259 (E.D. Va. 1993).
200. Virginia Beach, 825 F. Supp. at 1259.
201. Id. at 1259 n.3.
202. Id. at 1259 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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The case ultimately was dismissed without prejudice because
the Oxford House claim was not ripe for adjudication as a result
of its failure to apply for special use permits, which, if granted,
would allow the homes to operate."'
The Ninth Circuit also refused to follow the Elliott opinion. In
City of Edmonds v. Washington State Building Code Council,2 4
Oxford House successfully challenged the city's limit of five
unrelated persons in single-family districts. The district court
had applied the exemption to uphold the city's zoning enforce-
ment,2"5 but on appeal, the circuit court concluded that the re-
striction must be interpreted to include only those restrictions
that apply to all occupants, regardless of their family status."'
In effect, the Ninth Circuit reached precisely the opposite con-
clusion from the court in Elliott, although both purported to rely
on congressional intent. In Elliott, the court concluded that Con-
gress could not have intended to invalidate the hundreds of
family definitions that restricted unrelated householders." 7 In
Edmonds, the court found legislators could not possibly have
intended to exempt such a pervasive restriction on the ability of
the disabled to share congregate living arrangements." 8
The Edmonds interpretation is probably correct. In Elliott, the
court placed too much emphasis on the Supreme Court's distinc-
tion in Belle Terre between related and unrelated householders.
Although the opinion persuasively concludes that Congress,
within the bounds of the Constitution, could have exempted
restrictions on unrelated householders, it offers scant evidence
that they did.
203. Id. at 1261-62.
204. 18 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 1994).
205. Id. at 803.
206. Id. at 805.
207. [Iun light of the prevalence of zoning regulations which limit unrelated
persons without a simultaneous limitation upon related persons ....
[wie do not believe that Congress intended that the maximum occupancy
limitation exemption would apply only to a limitation on the maximum
number of persons per square foot of dwelling space.
Elliott, 960 F.2d at 980.
208. Edmonds, 18 F.3d at 806 ("Many cities in this country have adopted similar
use restrictions .... Applying the exemption would insulate these single-family resi-
dential zones from the sweep of [FHA] requirements.") (citations omitted).
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The Legislative history clearly supports the narrower reading.
In fact, the prefatory language to the oft-cited discussion of the
exemption indicates that it was intended to exempt restrictions
related to the family-status protection provided by the Act."0 9
The inclusion of this discussion negates any argument that the
exemptions would apply to unrelated occupants.
Given the explicit congressional references to accommodating
group-living arrangements and the widespread use of restrictive
family definitions, the exemption likely applies only to square
footage limits. This view also appears to be the majority position
among the district courts that have faced the issue.21°
If the Supreme Court adopts this view, such numerical restric-
tions will be subject to the same three pronged anti-discrimina-
tion attack as other local regulation under the statute. Absent
legislative relief in the form of an amendment including unrelat-
ed-persons restrictions in the exemption, localities seeking to
regulate recovery homes will need to focus on solutions that can
withstand disparate impact and reasonable accommodation
attacks under the anti-discrimination provisions of the FHA.
COMPETING INTERESTS OF MUNICIPALITIES AND RECOVERY
HOME ADVOCATES
The remainder of this Note is devoted to identifying the legiti-
mate, competing concerns of recovery home advocates and mu-
nicipalities and devising a proposed definition of recovery home
as a new use category in an attempt to provide a solution. Such
a definition, combined with a licensing procedure for recovery
home operators, offers a means of maintaining local control
without squelching the development of an effective treatment
209. H.R. REP. No. 711, supra note 34, at 31, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
2192. ("Section 6(d) amends Section 807 to make additional exceptions relating to the
familial status provisions.") (second emphasis added).
210. See Oxford House-C v. City of St. Louis, 843 F. Supp. 1556 (E.D. Mo. 1994);
Oxford House v. City of Va. Beach, 825 F. Supp. 1251 (E.D. Va. 1993); Parish of
Jefferson v. Allied Health Care, No. 91-1199, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9124 (E.D. La.
June 10, 1992). For an opinion following the Elliott position, see City of St. Joseph
v. Preferred Family Healthcare, Inc., 859 S.W.2d 723 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993). The dis-
trict court in St. Louis acknowledged the contrary authority and disagreed with the
Missouri appellate court.
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model. It is a small step towards reconciling the disparate inter-
ests of local planners and recovery home advocates.
Policy Conflict
As the cases indicate, the dispute between recovery home
operators and neighborhood opponents often is portrayed as the
classic case of the "Not In My Back Yard" (NIMBY) syn-
drome.21' The issues are actually much more far reaching. In
fact, the inclusion of the handicapped as a protected class, and
the broad definition of discriminatory intent under the FHA, has
made the cases of simple neighborhood discrimination easy for
the federal courts.212 The more complicated issues involve the
basic division of regulatory power between the federal govern-
ment and municipalities seeking to maintain control over a
quintessentially local function.
Federal support of recovery homes is evidenced by their inclu-
sion in the FHA and the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988.213 Many
states have announced similar policies through state legislation
attempting to curtail local, exclusionary-zoning practices.214
Yet municipalities, whose interests lie in preserving the "bless-
ings of quiet seclusion"215 continue to resist attempts to usurp
their control over the regulation of recovery homes. Both sides
have legitimate objectives, which are explored in this section of
the Note.
The Efficacy and Economy of Recovery Homes
Abuse of drugs and alcohol is one of the most critical problems
facing the nation. In fiscal year 1990, more than 800,000 Ameri-
cans were treated for drug or alcohol abuse -more than
211. For a thorough discussion of NIMBY, see Ellis, supra note 32; Salsich, supra
note 55.
212. See supra notes 123-65 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 43-54, 65 and accompanying text.
214. See Steinman, supra note 33, at 18-24 (summarizing state legislation on the
subject). Though state laws vary widely, nearly all were established to support "an
overriding state policy [favoring deinstitutionalization]." Id. at 17-18.
215. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974).
216. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES 1993, at 136.
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200,000 had both problems. 217 Estimates of the number of
Americans who abuse drugs or alcohol without treatment run
into the tens *of millions.2"8 The combined cost of treatment in
government-funded facilities alone was nearly three billion dol-
lars.219 But that amount is a pittance compared with the over-
all cost to society in lost productivity, increased crime, and the
tragic price paid by families whose loved ones are victims of
drug- or alcohol-related violence. Though estimates of such costs
vary, reliable figures place the societal cost of alcohol abuse
alone at roughly $100 billion. ° The bill for both drug and al-
cohol problems has been calculated at $273 billion.22'
Recovery homes, like those established by Oxford House, serve
an important function in combatting drug and alcohol abuse: the
avoidance of relapse.2 2 Therapist Milton Trachtenberg de-
scribed the challenges facing the newly sober in his book on
treating addicted persons:
[I]n the early phases of recovery, the addicted person is most
susceptible to relapse ....
[U]nderlying values and attitudes that have been built up
over a period of years do not just depart with the removal of
the abused substance.
ITihe system in which the individual is functioning... is
often in a subtle conspiracy to regain the prior status quo.
217. Id.
218. In a 1991 survey, 12.6 million Americans reported using illegal drugs in the
prior month, and 2.4 million reported using cocaine or crack. See BUREAU OF JUs-
TICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DRUGS, CRIME, AND THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 26
(1992).
219. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, STATE REsOURCES RELATED TO
ALCOHOL & OTHER DRUG ABUSE PROBLEMS: FISCAL YEAR 1990, at 6.
220. U. S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICEs, EIGHTH SPECIAL REPORT TO THE
UNITED STATES CONGRESS ON ALCOHOL AND HEALTH 11-3 (1993).
221. DOROTHY P. RICE ET AL., THE ECONOMIC CosTs OF ALCOHOL AND DRUG ABUSE
AND MENTAL ILLNESS: 1985, at 2.
222. For a survey of studies on relapse rates among recovering addicts and alco-
holics, see TREATING THE CHEMICALLY DEPENDENT AND THEIR FAMILIES 131-33 (Den-
nis C. Daley & Miriam S. Raskin eds., 1992) [hereinafter TREATING THE CHEMICALLY
DEPENDENT]. Daley and Raskin cite studies indicating relapse rates from 60% to
90%. They caution, however, that these rates may slightly overstate the problem by
failing to measure the cumulative result of many attempts at recovery, of which only
the last is fully successful. Id. at 132.
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The significant others in the life of an addicted individual
have learned to cope with the addiction, and often they have
reached a point.., where the addiction has become a neces-
sary part of their behavioral repertoire.2
Fellowship, therefore, is an important element of relapse pre-
vention.224 The support gained from sharing experiences with
other recovering addicts is only one benefit. In addition, group
activities help addicts develop positive social and recreational
activities that do not involve drinking or drugs.2" The varia-
tion in seniority among group members provides models for the
newly sober and incentives to stick with their recovery
program.2 26
Many studies have documented the importance of these social
support systems in reducing relapse rates. 27 Relapse frequent-
ly occurs when addicts who have completed a detoxification
program are unable to get into effective out-patient treatment or
a recovery-home setting due to overcrowding.2 ' Although not
studied widely, it appears that the Oxford House model is an
effective solution to this problem. 9 The rapidly increasing
number of Oxford House facilities in the years since govern-
ment startup loans became available is testament to the need
for expansion of such opportunities.23 °
Recovery homes also have an advantage over traditional in-
patient forms of therapy from an economic standpoint. Part of
the recovery model requires the homes to be self-sufficient.23'
Under the Oxford House plan, residents must be employed and
223. MILTON TRACHTENBERG, JOURNEYS TO REcovERY: THERAPY WITH ADDICTED
CLIENTS 12 (1990).
224. TREATING THE CHEMICALLY DEPENDENT, supra note 222, at 119.
225. Id. at 166.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 155 (summarizing studies).
228. Id. at 154.
229. Gelernter, supra note 6, at M1 (quoting DePaul University researcher Leonard
Jason, who calls Oxford House "an amazing grassroots phenomenon" and "an incredi-
ble system of health care delivery" and marvels at the lack of scholarly assessment
of the relatively new program's efficacy).
230. See The Oxford House Experiment, supra note 60, at W15 (describing the ap-
plication process when a rare opening occurs at one of the Washington, D.C., Oxford
Houses).
231. MOLLOY, supra note 12, at 1.
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pay rent to support the house, limiting the level of government
support and building vital self-esteem for the residents.232 Un-
fortunately, government loans to start recovery homes are not
conditioned on the adoption of all the Oxford House guide-
lines. 33
Potential Pitfalls of the Government Version of Oxford House
Despite support from the treatment community and the rela-
tively low cost of implementation, there are some serious prob-
lems with the rapidly expanding network of recovery homes.
First, the homes permit no professional staff.234 This require-
ment is consistent with the Oxford House theory of self-reli-
ance235 and serves to minimize costs. At the same time, howev-
er, it eliminates the critical elements of permanence and stabili-
ty that distinguish other types of congregate housing.236 Absent
some type of permanent staff, paid or unpaid, the only difference
between a recovery home and a fraternity house is that the
former shelters recovering alcoholics and the latter frequently
shelters practicing ones. Both are protected from housing dis-
crimination under the amended FHA.237
232. See id.
233. See Guidelines-Group Homes for Recovering Substance Abusers, 54 Fed. Reg.
15,808 (1989) [hereinafter Federal Guidelines].
234. See id.
235. MOLLOY, supra note 12, at 23-24.
236. This factor is important from a zoning standpoint. Most jurisdictions that do
not limit unrelated persons numerically, structure a definition that allows them to
live together as long as they are the "functional equivalent" of a family. Usually this
involves some assessment of permanence and stability. The recovery house model,
which forbids professional staff and requires expulsion of any member who relapses,
is antithetical to such a definition of family. See, e.g., Oxford House v. City of Alba-
ny, 819 F. Supp. 1168, 1177 n.6 (N.D.N.Y. 1993); Oxford House-Evergreen v. City
of Plainfield, 769 F. Supp. 1329, 1335 (D.N.J. 1991).
237. See H.R. REP. No. 711, supra note 34, at 94, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 2228-29. This amendment excludes from protection those persons currently using
or addicted to a controlled substance; however, the House Judiciary Committee
turned back attempts to exclude persons with existing alcohol abuse problems. Id.
Therefore, under the FHA even current alcoholics are covered unless they fall under
one of the statute's other exclusions. This decision prompted dissenting comments
from several legislators who viewed such an inclusive approach as conflicting with
the national goal of reducing alcohol abuse. Id. at 86, 94, reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2221, 2228-29.
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Second, the federal regulations designed to implement the
startup loan program place no restrictions on the origin of the
"self-support" funds.23 By eliminating the Oxford House tenet
that residents must work to pay rent, the legislation undercuts
the treatment philosophy. It also has spawned a cottage indus-
try of imitators who can pack recovering addicts into a home
and deduct their weekly rent from welfare or disability
payments." 9 Unfortunately, the autonomy sought by Oxford
House as a vehicle for recovery can be replaced by anarchy when
a home is started without the proper guidance or motive.24 °
The Oxford House litigators have an outstanding track record,
in part because they are able to fill the record with anecdotal
evidence of success 4' and statistical evidence of the need for
treatment.242 As a result, federal court precedent is overwhelm-
238. Federal Guidelines, supra note 233, at 15,808. The federal guidelines for estab-
lishing a qualifying recovery home are surprisingly limited:
(A) the use of alcohol or any illegal drug in the housing provided by
the program will be prohibited;
(B) any resident of the housing who violates such prohibition will be
expelled from the housing;
(C) the costs of the housing, including fees for rent and utilities, will
be paid by the residents of the housing, and
(D) the residents of the housing will, through a majority vote of the
residents, otherwise establish policies governing residence in the housing,
including the manner in which applications for residence in the housing
are approved.
Id.
239. See Warrick & Spiegel, supra note 11, at Al.
To fill their facilities with addicts, some operators pay "finders" fees or
bonuses for referrals. A Marina del Rey realty agent who owns a South
Central Los Angeles home pays his residents $50 each for every new
resident they bring in. A consulting firm charges $1000 to set up a new
sober-living house and fill it.
Id.
240. Id. In California, as many as 55 recovering addicts are living' in a single
home, some packed 10 to a room, others squeezed into attic crawl spaces or closets.
"Operators sometimes maximize revenue by renting beds in dining rooms, garages,
camper trailers, even old cars-anywhere a body can fit. They typically charge $300
a month per person." Id.
241. See United States v. Village of Palatine, 3 Am. Disabilities Dec. (Law. Co-op)
271, 279-80 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (recounting testimony of "Tom": After suffering a six-year
relapse and undergoing inpatient treatment a second time, Tom "moved directly into
Oxford House and has been drug and alcohol free ever since"; testimony of "Steve":
Oxford House is "'a recovering community that acts like a family").
242. See Oxford House-C v. City of St. Louis, 843 F. Supp. 1556, 1564 (E.D. Mo.
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ing local ability to regulate group homes. Several courts have
construed as discrimantory mere application procedures for
obtaining use permits.243 Such cases threaten to open the door
to less benevolent operators who seek to exploit the disabled at
government expense. Oxford House officials contend that new
home residents still must demonstrate that they are handi-
capped within the meaning of the statute,244 but they argue
simultaneously that any application or permitting process vio-
lates their right to "reasonable accommodation" in zoning prac-
tices.245 Their nationwide practice of evading local zoning en-
forcement defeats legitimate attempts to verify that recovery
home residents are, in fact, entitled to protection under the FHA
and to make reasonable accommodations in local ordinances for
such homes.
The Permissible Purposes of Zoning
Much of the substantive zoning law derives from common law
nuisance doctrines that were, of course, derived from disputes
between neighboring landowners over the proper uses of land in
a common district." Neighborhood opposition, therefore, is not
a per se indication of impermissible discrimination.247 Indeed,
as the discussion above illustrates, the establishment of unsu-
pervised group homes in residential districts raises legitimate
concerns.248 Unfortunately, illegitimate concerns often motivate
neighborhood opposition.249
1994) (relating testimony of the Director of Missouri Division of Alcohol and Drug
Abuse: with more than 300,000 individuals fighting drug and alcohol problems in the
state, "there is a tremendous need for Oxford House in the treatment continuum").
243. See id. at 1581-82; Oxford House, Inc. v. Township of Cherry Hill, 799 F.
Supp. 450, 462 n.25 (D.N.J. 1992).
244. Telephone Interview with Steve Polin, Chief Counsel, Oxford House, Inc. (Mar.
9, 1994).
245. Oxford House, Inc. v. City of Va. Beach, 825 F. Supp. 1251, 1255-56 (E.D. Va.
1993); see United States v. Village of Palatine, 37 F.3d 1230, 1234 (7th Cir. 1994);
Oxford House, Inc. v. City of Albany, 819 F. Supp. 1168, 1177-78 (N.D.N.Y. 1993).
246. See ANDERSON, supra note 21, § 8.01.
247. See Ellis, supra note 32, at 275-76.
248. See supra notes 234-40 and accompanying text.
249. See Ellis, supra note 32, at 289-91. Motivation is key, because it affects the
presumption of validity afforded local zoning decisions. Valid zoning decisions face
the reversal of that presumption if made with discriminatory animus. Id.
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Before reviewing a possible system to accommodate both re-
covery home operators and home neighbors, it is helpful to con-
sider some of the valid reasons for local regulation of recovery
homes. First, the more intense use, namely increased traffic and
noise, is a nuisance for surrounding homeowners. The Supreme
Court has recognized the nuisance presented by a more inten-
sive use: "More people occupy a given space; more cars rather
continuously pass by; more cars are parked; noise travels with
crowds."25 Several of the complaints against recovery homes
have involved increased noise and traffic.25' Unlike group
homes for the disabled, or foster homes for children, recovery
homes house adults, with adult relationships, needs for trans-
portation, and social habits.2 The fact that residents are re-
covering alcoholics does not diminish the greatly increased de-
mands placed on a home and neighborhood by ten adult men or
women living in one place.253
Second, local officials have a legitimate interest in document-
ing and regulating nonconforming uses, regardless of their abili-
ty to reject such uses. Oxford House contends that even applica-
tion requirements in zoning codes violate their right to a reason-
able accommodation, and some courts have agreed.254 Their
conclusion ignores a basic prerequisite to the application of the
FHA-the determination that a protected class is involved. By
removing the mechanism through which localities ensure com-
pliance with the FHA, the federal courts would require local
planners to sue in federal court in order to establish that recov-
ery home residents were, in fact, entitled to favored status. In
addition, the policy preempts a reasonable accommodation
250. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974).
251. See id.; United States v. Borough of Audobon, 797 F. Supp. 353, 356 (D.N.J.
1991), affd, 968 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1992).
252. Oxford House, Inc. has recognized some of the problems associated with traffic
and intensity of use, as noted in its technical manual: "[Tihe only threat of an Ox-
ford House being less than a good neighbor is the automobile." MOLLOY, supra note
12, at 17.
253. The average number of residents in a chartered Oxford House is ten. Id. at
13. The homes are all single sex. Id.
254. See Oxford House-C v. City of St. Louis, 843 F. Supp 1556, 1579 (E.D. Mo.
1994); Oxford House, Inc. v. Township of Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. 450, 462 n.25
(D.N.J. 1992).
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through the process established by the locality.
A more complicated question is whether permanency and
stability are legitimate goals for zoning to pursue. A few of the
cases turn on definitions of family that require such permanen-
cy-"5 In Oxford House, Inc. v. Township of Cherry Hill,256 for
example, the township's zoning ordinance defined "family" as "a
collective body of persons doing their own cooking and living to-
gether upon the premises as a separate housekeeping unit in a
domestic relationship based upon birth, marriage or other do-
mestic bond."25 Such functional definitions attempt to codify
those elements of a biological family that provide for harmonious
relationships among residential neighbors. Oxford House con-
tends that residents in its homes meet this functional definition.
Although recovery homes are supposed to simulate the structure
of a family to aid in recovery, the rule requiring expulsion of any
member who relapses is antithetical to the concept of permanen-
cy attached to functional definitions of family."'
Many of these concerns can be addressed by a slight modifica-
tion to local zoning practices that accounts for the special con-
cerns of both sides. Local regulators must recognize the impact
of the federal mandate, expressed through inclusion in the FHA
and the startup loan provisions. Recovery home operators must
realize that this mandate does not create a blanket waiver of
local regulation. The final section of this Note attempts to offer a
regulatory middle ground based on the legislatively- and judi-
cially-created boundaries for local control.
TOWARD A SOLUTION
[W]hat this matter truly needs is not judicial action, whether
it be state or federal, but for the parties to search their con-
sciences, recognize the needs and hopes of the plaintiffs and
the concerns and fears of the neighbors, and arrive at an
255. Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. at 454; Oxford House-Evergreen v. City of
Plainfield, 769 F. Supp. 1329, 1333 (D.N.J. 1991); Oxford House, Inc. v. City of
Albany, 819 F. Supp. 1168, 1170 (N.D.N.Y. 1993).
256. 799 F. Supp. at 450.
257. Id. at 455.
258. See Albany, 819 F. Supp. at 1177 n.6.
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accommodation which serves and enriches all who are in-
volved in and affected by it.
259
"The right to 'establish a home' is an essential part of the
liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment."26 In recov-
ery home disputes, however, both parties' rights to establish a
home conflict in fundamental ways.
In addition to resolving the individual claims, the litigation
arising from these conflicts provides a useful basis for establish-
ing the limits of each party's legitimate objections. For instance,
recovery home operators have asserted that any use permit re-
quirement is an unacceptable burden because of the threat of
public humiliation attendant with the hearing process, which
may threaten the residents' recovery.26' Most courts, however,
have held that an application process for such permits is not per
se discriminatory as long as applications are required of other
similarly-situated groups of unrelated people." 2 These deci-
sions impliedly approve of some type of registration, licensing, or
permitting scheme as a legitimate means of control over unsu-
pervised group homes. This view is consistent with the majority
of state statutes on the subject.263
Recovery home operators also contend that maximum occu-
pancy limitations should not apply to recovery homes because an
individual's recovery process depends on socialization within a
group home. This claim has not been entirely successful. In
Elliott v. City of Athens,264 the Eleventh Circuit upheld a local
limit of four unrelated persons as reasonable in light of the city's
259. Plainfield, 769 F. Supp. at 1331.
260. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 15 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing).
261. See Oxford House, Inc. v. City of Va. Beach, 825 F. Supp. 1251, 1255 (E.D.
Va. 1993).
262. See United States v. Village of Palatine, 37 F.3d 1230 (7th Cir. 1994); Virginia
Beach, 825 F. Supp. at 1257; Albany 819 F. Supp. at 1178. But see Oxford
House-C v. City of St. Louis, 843 F. Supp. 1556, 1581-82 (E.D. Mo. 1994) (holding
that a recovery home could not "lawfully be required" to undergo a public hearing
and other variance procedures in order to qualify for an accommodation).
263. Of the 36 states that have passed legislation to preempt local zoning and
allow traditional group homes as of-right uses, nearly all require the homes to be
licensed by the state. See Steinman, supra note 33, at 25-36.
264. 960 F.2d 975 (11th Cir. 1992).
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asserted interest in preventing overcrowding."' Other courts,
including the Ninth Circuit, have reached different conclu-
sions.26 Regardless of how the Supreme Court rules on the is-
sue, the language of the FHA exemption for reasonable occu-
pancy limitations, suggests that numerical limitations of some
sort expressly are allowed.6 7 Moreover, even if the exemption
is not applied to a numerical family definition, it does not follow
that numerical regulation of any sort is forbidden. The FHA pro-
hibits discrimination not regulation. Both Oxford House and the
federal guidelines for start-up loans permit the establishment of
recovery homes with as few as six residents.6 Beyond this
number, the assertion that residents must share housing is eco-
nomic, not implicating therapeutic concerns.269
The Oxford House cases also establish that localities may not
make distinctions based on arbitrary classifications. Use permits
required only for disabled groups seeking congregate housing,
suspect since the Cleburne decision, 7 ° are now clearly inval-
id.27
1
Discriminatory motives will no longer be tolerated. The pre-
sumption of validity granted to local zoning ordinances is re-
versed when those ordinances are passed or enforced for discrim-
212inatory purposes. Although the Supreme Court was hesitant
to extend suspect class status to the handicapped in
Cleburne,27' the FHA effectively raised the standard by which
265. Id. at 982-83.
266. See City of Edmonds v. Washington State Bldg. Code Council, 18 F.3d 802
(9th Cir. 1994) (denying FHA exemption for ordinance that imposed maximum occu-
pancy limitations solely on group recovery homes), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 417
(1994).
267. See Elliott, 960 F.2d at 978-79.
268. See Federal Guidelines, supra note 233, at 15,808; MOLLOY, supra note 12, at
13.
269. United States v. Village of Palatine, 3 Am. Disabilities Dec. (Law. Co-op) 271,
298 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (.Suffice it to say that it is clear on the record that all of Ox-
ford House's rehabilitative purposes could be served with six or eight residents."),
adopted, No. 93-C-2154, 1993 WL 462848 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 9, 1993), vacated, 37 F.3d
1230 (7th Cir. 1994).
270. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 447-48
(1984).
271. See 42 U.S.C. § 3615; supra note 123 and accompanying text.
272. See Ellis, supra note 32, at 276.
273. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 454 (Stevens, J., concurring); supra notes 35-39 and
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barriers to their equal access to housing are reviewed. Moreover,
the broad interpretation of discriminatory intent under the FHA
requires scrupulously nondiscriminatory zoning enforcement. 4
A useful regulatory scheme begins to emerge within these
judicially-established criteria. A recent attempt to design an
ordinance for traditional group homes by the ABA Land Use
Regulation Committee identified the components of such a
scheme.27 They included (1) specific acceptance of residential
treatment, (2) density limits concerning occupancy, parking, and
group home dispersion, (3) objective standards and licensing
requirements to ensure compliance with health and safety re-
quirements, and (4) opportunities for community input."6
Many of these issues already have been addressed by statutes
governing more traditional, supervised and licensed group
homes. 77 These statutes frequently declare a state policy fa-
voring residential treatment and allow moderate-sized group
homes as of-right uses if certain licensing procedures are
met.
278
Unlike regular group homes, which frequently are supervised
treatment facilities, recovery homes present special problems for
local lawmakers. Under the federal statute, recovery homes
receiving startup grants can have no professional staff.
279
There is also no licensing procedure in place for homes not oper-
ating under the Oxford House umbrella.211 Moreover, the tran-
accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 121-35 and accompanying text.
275. Peter W. Salsich Jr., A Model Ordinance for Group Homes and Shared Hous-
ing, PROB. & PROP., Nov.-Dec. 1989, at 32, 34; see also, Salsich, supra note 55, at
432.
276. See Salsich, supra note 55, at 432-33.
277. Steinman, supra note 33, at 18-20.
278. Usually group homes of six to eight residents are allowed in most residential
districts, subject to their license and inspection by a state health department or
agency. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-581 to -582 (1993); CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE §§ 5115-5117 (West 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3177(6)(f) (West Supp.
1994); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. §§ 7-601 to -612 (1994); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. §§ 125.216a, 125.286a, 125.583b (West 1986 & Supp. 1994); N.Y. MENTAL HYG.
LAW § 41.34 (Consol. 1989 & Supp. 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 168-21 to -23 (1987 &
Supp. 1994); VA. CODE. ANN. § 15.1-486.3 (Michie Supp. 1994); W. VA. CODE §§ 27-
17-1 to -4, 8-24-50b (1992).
279. Federal Guidelines, supra note 233, at 15,509.
280. Id.
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siency, inherent in recovery homes as a result of the policy of
evicting residents who relapse, presents problems of stability
and accountability that generally are not present under the
typical group-home setting.28' While many recovery homes af-
filiate with local non-profit corporations, or with Oxford House
itself, there is no requirement that they do so.28 2
The remainder of this Note will address these differences in
an attempt to create a statutory definition of a recovery
home.28 The goal is to structure a definition that would allow
the effective use of the recovery home model while retaining
some measure of local control over regulation of such homes.
Several modifications to traditional group home statutes
would recognize the legitimate concerns of both parties to the
recovery home dispute. First, because most states,2" and the
federal government,285 already have declared a policy favoring
residential treatment of the disabled, specific acceptance and an-
nouncement of that goal would serve a useful educational pur-
pose for potential group home neighbors. The fact that the Ox-
ford House model has proven a successful aid in the prevention
of relapse provides evidence that the expansion of that system
should be encouraged. The announcement, whether formal or
informal, might be accompanied by the delegation of supervisory
authority over recovery home regulation to an existing or newly-
created local agency. The agency should administer a program of
registration and licensing for recovery homes seeking to locate
within the jurisdiction.
281. Of course, the idea of the homes is to prevent relapse, but they are not al-
ways successful. In Plainfield, New Jersey, for example, the evidence showed that 13
of the 20 people admitted to the local Oxford House had left, nine due to relapse.
Oxford House-Evergreen v. City of Plainfield, 769 F. Supp. 1329, 1342 (D.N.J.
1991). The average length of stay for an Oxford House resident is 13 to 15 months.
Oxford House-C v. City of St. Louis, 843 F. Supp. 1556, 1563 (E.D. Mo. 1994).
282. Federal Guidelines, supra note 233, at 15,808.
283. A statutory definition is the simplest way to modify local zoning ordinances.
Most zoning codes include a definitions section, which defines prescribed uses, at the
beginning and then list those uses in the relevant zoning districts where they are
either permitted as a matter of right or subject to conditions. See, e.g., ROANOKE,
VA., CODE § 36.1-25 (1993); VIRGINIA BEACH, VA., CODE app. A § 111 (1994).
284. See Steinman, supra note 33, at 18-20.
285. See H.R. REP. No. 711, supra note 34, at 23, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 2184.
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Density limits, both in terms of occupancy and spacing re-
quirements between group homes, are probably the most divisive
of the group home issues. Although appellate courts have recog-
nized the legitimacy of maximum occupancy limits28 and spac-
ing requirements,8 7 group home operators also have defeated
attempts to exclude residents based on both numerical 28 and
functional. 9 definitions of family and turned back dispersion
requirements.2 1' Recognition of recovery homes by definition in
the zoning code will provide a useful basis for determining the
exact limits of numerical and functional family definitions. Many
of the disputes can be resolved by creating a new zoning use
with the particular needs of recovery homes in mind.
The most difficult element of any provision authorizing con-
gregate housing in a single-family residential area is the num-
ber of residents permitted.29' In the state statutes governing
traditional group homes, nearly all allow group homes of be-
tween six and eight residents as of-right uses.292 A recovery
home of similar size places no greater burden on the neighbor-
hood and also should be allowed of-right. However, most recov-
ery homes are substantially larger,2"' housing as many as eigh-
286. Elliott v. City of Athens, 960 F.2d 975, 983 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 376 (1992).
287. Familystyle of St. Paul, Inc. v. City of St. Paul, 923 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1991).
288. City of Edmonds v. Washington State Bldg. Code Council, 18 F.3d 802 (9th
Cir. 1994) (holding unrelated persons limit not exempt from FHA), cert. granted, 115
S. Ct. 417 (1994); Oxford House, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 819 F. Supp. 1179
(E.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that undir FHA, town's refusal to modify definition of "fam-
ily" in zoning ordinance that limited number of unrelated people who could live in
residence was discriminatory); Oxford House-C v. St. Louis, 843 F. Supp. 1556
(E.D. Mo. 1994) (holding that ordinance restricting dwellings in single-family zone
was classic "unrelated persons" provision and did not fall within exemption to FHA).
289. Oxford House-Evergreen v. City of Plainfield, 769 F. Supp. 1329, 1343
(D.N.J. 1991); Oxford House, Inc. v. Township of Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. 450, 461
(D.N.J. 1992).
290. Horizon House Dev. Servs. v. Township of Upper Southampton, 804 F. Supp.
683, 693 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
291. In St. Louis the court commented that "a great deal of evidence at trial was
devoted to the appropriate size of an Oxford House, both from a therapeutic and
from a financial viewpoint." St. Louis, 843 F. Supp. at 1571.
292. See Steinman, supra note 33, at 18-20; statutes cited supra note 278.
293. MOLLOY, supra note 12, at 13. The average number of residents per Oxford
House is ten. Many of the homes not affiliated with Oxford House are even larger.
There are no maximum limits imposed by the Federal Guidelines. See Federal
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teen to twenty recovering addicts. These larger homes should be
subjected to a permitting process to assess the legitimate inter-
ests of neighboring property owners.
A definition that allowed recovery homes of ten or fewer resi-
dents as an of-right use would comport with most state laws, as
they frequently allow eight unrelated individuals and two unre-
lated staff members.294 Because the recovery home residents
serve the dual role of patient and counselor in one another's
recovery, the limit of ten is consistent with state-imposed group
home mandates for other populations. More important, this
definition would permit homes of sufficient size to be both eco-
nomically and therapeutically viable.
A second tier of the definition, called a conditional recovery
home, should be created to accommodate group homes of greater
than ten.295 At this level, recovery home operators should be
required to submit to the traditional form of public hearing
required for a conditional use by the local jurisdiction.296
Oxford House has challenged such hearings on two points.
First, they contend the large number of residents is crucial to
the economic and therapeutic viability of recovery homes.29
The therapeutic argument, however, is disputed by their own
guidelines,29 and those of the federal program,299 which re-
Guidelines, supra note 233.
294. See, e.g., ALA. CODE. § 11-52-75.1 (1994) (allowing ten residents plus two
staff); COLO. REV. STAT. § 30-28-115 (1993) (allowing eight residents plus staff); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 12-736 (1991) (allowing eight residents plus two staff); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 89.020(2) (1993) (allowing eight residents plus two staff).
295. Although the average Oxford House has ten residents, many are larger, and
the federal guidelines for startup loans do not place an upper limit on the number
of recovery home residents. See Federal Guidelines, supra note 233.
296. Note that the larger homes are still permitted uses, subject to proper permit-
ting and perhaps the imposition of certain conditions (parking, safety improvements,
etc.). Such conditional uses should be distinguished from variances, which seek ex-
emption from certain specific requirements such as setbacks, or occupancy limits.
The variance process should not be used to "spot zone" certain homes as adequate
for recovery home purposes. See Oxford House-C v. City of St. Louis, 843 F. Supp.
1556, 1569-70 (E.D. Mo. 1994) (discussing the difference between conditional uses
and variances).
297. See St. Louis, 843 F. Supp. at 1564 n.2; Oxford House-Evergreen v. City of
Plainfield, 769 F. Supp. 1329, 1334 (D.N.J. 1991).
298. MOLLOY, supra note 12, at 13.
299. Federal Guidelines, supra note 233, at 15,808.
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quire no less than four residents to constitute a recovery home.
The economic argument is not relevant to the disability and
should not be a factor in allowing a nonconforming use unless it
can be shown that smaller, less expensive homes are unavail-
able. Such a showing properly can be made before local officials
during the conditional use review process.
Second, recovery home operators argue the permit process
itself is discriminatory because it may subject residents to com-
munity scorn and jeopardize their rehabilitation. Courts dis-
agree, however, and have required participation in the local
review process as a precondition to suit under the FHA."'
The purpose of the reasonable accommodation clause in the
statute is to balance the interests of the handicapped against
those of the other members of the community. As one district
court has pointed out, this balance is particularly important in
the context of land-use cases.3"' A definition that distinguishes
between recovery homes of ten or fewer and larger homes does
not necessarily exclude the latter. °2 By requiring recovery
home operators to meet with local residents, the distinction
facilitates the type of balancing called for under a reasonable
accommodation test.
Another element of consideration should be the proximity of
other group homes. Many of the state statutes covering tradi-
tional group homes include spacing or dispersion guidelines. 3
Such guidelines serve to avoid an unhealthy concentration of
group homes, which results in a "ghettoization" of the disabled
that is contrary to the normalization principles group homes
300. United States v. Village of Palatine, 37 F.3d 1230, 1234 (7th Cir. 1994); Ox-
ford House, Inc. v. City of Va. Beach, 825 F. Supp. 1251, 1261 (E.D. Va. 1993);
Oxford House, Inc. v. City of Albany, 819 F. Supp. 1168, 1178 (N.D.N.Y. 1993); see
supra notes 175-84.
301. See Virginia Beach, 825 F. Supp at 1261.
302. St. Louis, 843 F. Supp. at 1580 (acknowledging the desirability of permitting
larger recovery homes as "conditional uses").
303. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 9, § 4923 (1989) (requiring that no similar
group homes be within a 5000-foot radius of the home); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 462.357(7) (West 1991) (excessive concentration prohibited); N.Y. MENTAL HYG.
LAW § 41.34 (Consol. 1989 & Supp. 1993) (concentration cannot substantially alter
the character of the area); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168-21 to -23 (1987 & Supp. 1994)
(one mile radius); W. VA. CODE §§ 27-17-1 to -4, 8-24-50b (1990 & 1992) (1200 feet
outside municipality, one per block within the municipality).
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seek to promote.
The third element of model group home regulation is objective
standards for group homes. This area overlaps somewhat with
the licensing requirement because frequently: licensing is depen-
dent on the application of some objective set of criteria. Nearly
all state statutes designed to permit the establishment of group
homes require licensing, usually by some state authority, in
order to qualify as an of-right use. °4 Recovery homes, however,
differ fundamentally from these more traditional forms of com-
munity-based treatment. The cause of alcohol and drug addic-
tion is as much a factor of environment as physical or mental
condition. Recovering addicts' ability to care for themselves and
for property is not impaired,"5 nor does their disability place
any greater burden on a building than that of a typical group of
unrelated adults.0 ' Therefore, a cumbersome system of inspec-
tion and licensing, while necessary to protect the safety interests
of group home residents with more severe physical disabilities,
would cause hardship for recovery homes not legitimately relat-
ed to the land use.
Nonetheless, localities have legitimate interests in regulating
nonconforming land uses. Oxford House's policy of moving in
unannounced, waiting for zoning enforcement action, and then
seeking relief in the federal courts removes any opportunity for
local officials to act. It may be, as Oxford House litigators sug-
gest,0 7 that the locality is powerless to exclude them, but the
304. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-3e, -3f (West 1989 & Supp. 1994) (De-
partment of Mental Retardation); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. §§ 7-601 to -612
(1994) (Department of Health and Mental Hygiene); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:55D-66.1
to -66.2 (West 1993) (Department of Human Services); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW
§ 41.34 (Consol. 1989 & Supp. 1993) (Office of Mental Health); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 15.1-486.3 (Michie Supp. 1994) (Department of Social Services); W. VA. CODE
§§ 27-17-1 to -4, 8-24-50b (1990 & 1992) (Department of Health); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§§ 46.03(22) (West 1987 & Supp. 1994) (Department of Health and Social Services).
305. United States v. Borough of Audobon, 797 F. Supp. 353, 358 (D.N.J. 1991).
The local regulators in Audobon asserted, and Oxford House did not dispute, that
the residents were not physically disabled. Rather, their handicap was based on an
inability to live independently. Id. at 359.
306. United States v. Village of Palatine, 3 Am. Disabilities Dec. (Law. Co-op) 271,
295-96 (N.D. Ill.) (concluding Oxford House residents were more like a family for
purpose of increased fire safety regulations), adopted, No. 93-C-2154, 1993 WL
462848 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 9, 1993), vacated, 37 F.3d 1230 (7th Cir. 1994).
307. See Oxford House, Inc. v. City of Va. Beach, 825 F. Supp. 1251, 1261 (E.D.
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locality should not be powerless to know who and where they
are and require some evidence or declaration that the residents
indeed are handicapped within the meaning of the FHA.
Accordingly, a pehnitting system should be required for recov-
ery homes of all sizes. Proposed operators would fill out relative-
ly simple paperwork as a condition of receiving the recovery
home designation. The principle elements of the registration or
license would be the identification of a responsible party,"' the
location and size of the proposed home, the number of residents,
their names, and the nature of their disabilities. In addition, the
statute would permit the request of assurances that none of the
residents suffered from "current, illegal use of or addiction to a
controlled substance,"3" 9 or had prior convictions that would
exempt them from protection under the Act.31
Such a form would not expose the prospective residents to any
public ridicule or contempt that could jeopardize their recovery.
Indeed, it would be a far less intrusive means of establishing
their right to reasonable accommodation than litigating their
claims in federal court. Of course, conditional recovery homes of
greater than ten residents could still be required to apply for a
conditional use permit.
Opportunities for community input are critical to the success
of a system of recovery home regulation. The federal courts have
threatened to expropriate this right in cases where the applica-
tion and hearing process was held to be invalid under the
FHA.31 The conditional use permitting process provides op-
portunities to consider community concerns as well as involve
potential neighbors in the work of recovery homes. Because
smaller recovery homes present less of an intrusion, a munici-
pality should exclude them from the conditional use permitting
Va. 1993).
308. Most Oxford Houses are leased either to the group itself or to a number of
individual residents. The prospective residents should be required to designate either
the owner, one or more leaseholders, or a local recovery home leader or non-profit
officer as the principle contact for zoning complaints.
309. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h) (1988).
310. Id. § 3607(4).
311. Oxford House-C v. City of St. Louis, 843 F. Supp. 1556, 1581 (E.D. Mo.
1994); Oxford House, Inc. v. Township of Cherry Hill, 799 F. Supp. 450, 462 n.25
(D.N.J. 1992).
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requirement, but some form of community involvement should
be encouraged, perhaps through a board of directors or neighbor-
hood association to aid in the home's funding and maintenance.
For larger homes, a permit hearing gives neighbors the chance
to voice appropriate concerns and gives recovery home residents
an opportunity to address those concerns.
Considering the elements of local permitting or registration
and numerical limits on the number of residents, a model defini-
tion of a recovery home might provide the following:
Recovery Home - A dwelling or facility housing ten or fewer
persons unrelated by blood, marriage, adoption, or guardian-
ship, and registered with [the appropriate local authority] for
the purpose of the residents' joint rehabilitation from alcohol
or drug addiction.
Conditional Recovery Home - A dwelling or facility housing
more than ten persons, unrelated by blood, marriage, adop-
tion, or guardianship, and registered with [the appropriate
local authority] for the purpose of the residents' joint rehabil-
itation from alcohol or drug addiction.
Recovery homes, so defined, would be of-right uses in all resi-
dential districts. Conditional recovery homes would be permitted
in all residential districts subject to the conditional-use permit-
ting process of the local jurisdiction. The factors to be considered
in awarding such a permit would include the size of the home,
the financial viability of alternative sites, and the proximity of
other group-home uses.
CONCLUSION
This Note has explored the conflict between local homeowners,
their municipal governments, and operators of unsupervised,
group homes for recovering alcoholics and drug addicts. Al-
though the amended FHA and successful arguments by recovery
home operators in the federal courts have limited greatly the
ability of localities to control the placement of these homes, this
Note has argued such interpretations should not be extended to
eliminate legitimate local interests. In light of the rapid expan-
sion of such homes and the special regulatory problems they
present, this Note offers modifications to the typical group home
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definition that will help alleviate the genuine concerns of local
residents while still allowing the development of this effective
and economical recovery program.
Douglas E. Miller
